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Abstract
The last global financial crisis clearly illustrated the crucial role of interbank linkages in channel-
ing and amplifying shocks hitting the system and, therefore, in the emergence of systemic risk.
In this thesis, we present theoretical and empirical methodologies for analysing the potential for
systemic risk in a interconnected banking network.
The dissertation comprehends two essays on financial networks and systemic risk and is organ-
ised in two chapters. In chapter I, we analyse and model some complex interactions and feedback
relationships within a financial network, with the objective of delving into the linkages between
fragility in the real economy and in the banking system. For this purpose, we provide a qualita-
tive and quantitative description of leverage dynamics.
In chapter II, we exploit an original dataset on 15 European banks classified as G-SIBs by the
BIS to assess whether expansion in foreign markets increases their riskiness, and through which
channels that eventually happens.
Sommario
L’ultima crisi finanziaria ha evidenziato il ruolo decisivo delle connessioni nel mercato interban-
cario come canale e strumento amplificatore dei shock finanziari, e di conseguenza del rischio
sistemico.
In questa tesi presentiamo delle metodologie teoriche ed empiriche per analizzare il potenziale
rischio sistemico in una rete bancaria interconnessa.
La tesi comprende due saggi sulle reti finanziarie e il rischio sistemico ed e` organizzata in due
capitoli. Nel capitolo I analizziamo e modelliamo alcune delle complesse interazioni all’interno
di una rete finanziaria, con l’obiettivo di approfondire nella interrelazione fra la fragilita` dell’eco-
nomia reale e quella del sistema bancario. A questo scopo, forniamo una descrizione qualitativa
e quantitativa delle dinamiche della leva finanziaria.
Nel capitolo II, sfruttiamo un set originale di dati su 15 banche europee classificate come G-SIB
per valutare se l’espansione nei mercati esteri aumenta la loro rischiosita`, e attraverso quali canali
si materializa.
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Chapter 1
Leverage Dynamics in
overlapping portfolios: a network
approach to systemic risk
In this paper we analyse and model some complex interactions and feedback relationships within
a financial network, with the objective of delving into the linkages between fragility in the real
economy and in the banking system. Our aim is to address the potential spillover effects of
external events on the vulnerability of the financial system by providing a qualitative and quan-
titative description of leverage dynamics. We explore financial contagion applying a network
approach combined with a balance-sheet amplification mechanism.
Keywords: Systemic Risk, Financial Networks, Leverage.
1
1.1 Introduction
We develop a network approach to analyse the potential spillover effects of external financial
disruptions on the interbank market.
A shock on external asset prices affects banks’ leverage, inducing fully-leveraged financial in-
termediaries to actively manage their balance sheets so as to maintain leverage at the target
level. In a financial system of interconnected financial institutions, this behaviour do may have
systemic effects.
We identify overlapping portfolios as the source of financial contagion and the balance sheet
management mechanism as the primary cause of amplification effects.
The procyclical leverage policy pursued by financial institutions translates into scenarios of
varying systemic leverage in response to changing levels of market volatility. Individualistic fi-
nancial institutions increase or reduce leverage depending on whether the market volatility is
low or high, causing systemic leverage trends that turn out destabilizing from a dynamical sys-
tem point of view (de Haas and Peters, 2004). On a systemic level, collective leveraging and
deleveraging of financial institutions can lead to asset market cycles.
The motivation behind our interest in the analysis of the dynamics unleashed by events ex-
ternal to the interbank market is the possible application of our analytic framework to the last
sovereign crisis in Europe, which has generated reasonable concerns about the trigger effects of
sovereign risk in the propagation of financial distress in a highly connected financial system.
As shown in previous literature (Darraq Paries and Faia, 2012; Baglioni and Cherubini, 2013),
there is a positive correlation between sovereign and bank risk. The aim of our analysis is to
explore how sovereign risk can spread to the banking system1. Our model tries to capture the
previous connection in order to evaluate the magnitude of the spillover effects of a deterioration
in sovereign financial robustness -or of a credit event affecting sovereign debt- on the banking
system. For this purpose, we delve into the dynamics of leverage within the financial network
given an exogenous shock in sovereign debt prices.
1.1.1 Some empirical facts
There has been a transmission of risk from the banking system to governments during the last
financial crisis, and then back from sovereign obligors to banks during the successive sovereign
crisis.
By the time of the financial turmoil in 2008, a significant fraction of external assets was
related to the real side of the economy (e.g., asset-backed, real estate and mortgage-backed se-
curities). When this kind of assets was hit by a fundamental shock and the interbank market of
highly leveraged financial institutions froze, governments performed bailout measures in order
to avoid the collapse of the financial system. As a consequence, the perceived default probability
of banks was reduced2.
Afterwards, as public needs for funding increased, banks boosted lending to governments. Given
the deterioration of public finance, Governments increased debt issuances. Being sovereign debt
classified as a safe asset, banks undertook purchases of that type of debt in order to expand Tier
1We omit the dynamics of shock propagation among sovereigns, which has already been covered in previous
work
2Gary et al. (2006) and Gapen et al. (2005) have previously provided the methodology for valuing the bailout
modelled as a put option to be included in the asset side of the balance sheet of financial intermediaries and in
the liability side of governments’ balance sheet. (Baglioni and Cherubini, 2013).
2
1 capital, as part of their strategy to meet capital requirements.
Somehow, a change in the composition of assets in the banks’ balance sheet took place: banks’
preferences shifted from assets related to real economy -in particular real estate- to sovereign
debt.
We consider a system of heterogeneous banks with linked balance sheets and positions in
external assets whose dynamics are described within a network. A bi-dimensional (internal-
external) structure could be identified, in the sense that there exists an interbank network,
where internal securities are negotiated, that also interacts with a network external to the bank
sector (the real economy, specifically the public sector -sovereigns-).
Figure 1.1: Illustration example of a stylised financial system
Accordingly to this configuration, it could be said that governments in the ”internal network”
became an important counterparty of the ”external network” as obligors in the first instance,
and then as creditors.
Following the bailout measures, the sovereign risk perceived by the markets increased, trig-
gering a rise of sovereign CDS spreads and the consequent fall in prices of sovereign debt. As
shown in previous literature (Adrian and Shin, 20110), price shocks can activate a balance-sheet
amplification mechanism; in the particular case of the European sovereign debt crises, the de-
crease in prices initially induced a contraction of highly-leveraged balance sheets -banks started
selling assets-, amplifying the effects of the initial shock.
Nevertheless, some empirical studies (Battistini, Pagano and Simonelli, 2014) have also revealed
that in some countries of the Eurozone, and especially in its periphery, bank’s sovereign expo-
sures responded positively to increases in yield, which suggests distorted incentives in periphery
banks’ behaviour. This would be the case if governments implement financial repression or banks
behave as value investors.
1.1.2 Systemic Risk and leverage.
In this paper we focus on the contribution of sovereign risk, i.e., a shock in external assets, to
the propagation of financial distress in a banking network. We identify leverage as the systemic
risk component of overlapping portfolios as well.
Systemic risk is commonly identified with the default of financial institutions (Poledna,
Thurner, Farmer and Geanokoplos, 2014). Other definitions refer to the risk of financial in-
stability “so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where
economic growth and welfare suffer materially” (ECB, 2010), or to “widespread failures and
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losses of financial institutions that impose externalities on the rest of the economy” (Achayra,
Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson, 2010). Other authors focus on more specific triggering
mechanisms when defining systemic risk: feedback behaviour (Kapadia, Drehman, Elliot and
Sterne, 2009), contagion (Moussa, 2011), correlates exposures (Achayra, Pedersen, Philippon
and Richardson, 2009), asset bubbles (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009)...
By systemic risk here we mean the vulnerability of the financial system to events triggering
contagion. The event causing the systemic episode will be a shock in the price of the sovereign
debt, our external asset. Credit asset prices incorporate the probability of default. A decrease in
sovereign debt prices can therefore be associated with an increase of the probability of sovereign
default and, consequently, of credit risk.
We model the behaviour of the systemic risk component -leverage- in a framework of market
dynamics amplifying the reaction triggered by an exogenous shock in sovereign debt prices.
In the literature several types of financial distress propagation and amplification mechanisms
can be identified, from the ones present in the traditional models of the financial accelerator re-
lying on the demand-side of credit channel (Bernanke, Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997)
to the financial intermediaries’ balance sheet dynamics (Adrian and Shin, 2010a; Geanakoplos,
2009).
When analysing the financial fragility in our model, we are identifying leverage as the prop-
agating factor of the financial distress triggered by the deterioration of sovereigns’ financial
robustness, i.e., a negative shock in external asset price, and overlapping portfolios as the struc-
ture that enables contagion within the banking network, that’s to say, the contagion mechanism.
On the purpose of exploring the relationship between systemic risk and the market procycli-
cality induced by the amplification mechanism, our research is developed in a context of active
management of marked-to-market balance sheets carried out by financial institutions in response
to fluctuations in prices and, therefore, measured risk.
Bank’s leverage, defined as its asset-to-equity ratio and expressed as a function of obligors’
leverage, is considered the propagation channel of a price shock. In our model the mecha-
nism works as follows: a negative shock to external asset prices lead to an increase in leverage.
Leverage-targeting banks will shrink their balance sheets by selling assets and repaying part of
the external debts. This active balance sheet adjustment may reinforce the business cycle and
can lead to a self-reinforcing amplification mechanism if procyclical leverage is allowed (Adrian
and Shin, 2010). This approach is aligned with the idea of endogenous crises: a high-leveraged
market becomes more vulnerable to small fluctuations.
In our model, the variation in the value of external securities holdings resulting from the balance
sheet management triggers the positive feedback.
In a banking network where agents are connected through overlapping balance sheets, shocks
to external asset prices not only induces an immediate variation on the leverage of those agents
holding that asset. Furthermore, spillover effects arise when the value of the internal assets,
i.e., other bank’s obligations, is affected due to the direct exposure of the obligor to the shocks
in prices; namely, the propagation of the shock within the financial network -contagion- occurs
through direct and indirect channels.3.
3Spillover effects across countries could be considered as banks may not only be exposed to the sovereign
risk of its own country, but also to the sovereign risk of other countries.However, this is beyond the scope of our
research.
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1.1.3 The financial sector and a network approach.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in network analysis applied to economic and financial
theory.
There is an increasing concern to improve the identification and understanding of systemic risk
and contagion mechanisms. Many authors have analyzed how the structure of the financial
system can affect the emergence of systemic risk and its propagation (F. Allen, A. Babus, E.
Carletti, 2010; Vitali, Battiston, Gallegati, 2013; Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-
Salehi, 2012; Battiston, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2011).
In order to study the contagion mechanism and the resiliency of the interbank market, we
adopt a network approach to represent the banking system.
How networks propagate shocks depends on how they are constructed4.
In our model, we design a static internal network, defining from the beginning the network
matrix representing the interbank market consisting of heterogeneous financial institutions. It
would be interesting to capture certain dynamics of the network under consideration by im-
plementing an endogenous mechanism of link formation, based on a preferential attachment
mechanism, for instance5. This will be useful to model certain processes such as the loss of den-
sity in the ”internal network”, due to a shrinking interbank market, but it’s beyond the scope
of this paper.
Nevertheless, we allow for dynamics regarding the interconnections between the internal and
external network by designing an external assets demand function6.
4In random networks, edges connecting vertices are generated randomly (Erdos and Renyi, 1950). Scale-free
networks have a power-law degree distribution of links (Barabasi and Albert, 1999).
5If this would be the case, the dynamics governing the interaction among agents could be described by
an endogenous fitness mechanism. The fitness of a node -the node’s inherent competitive factor- would be
susceptible to affect the network’s evolution. The probability of a node to connect to another would be supplied
with the node’s -agent- financial robustness (the inverse of the leverage expressed as the assets-to-equity ratio).
The introduction of the fitness property entails that the exponent in the power-law degree evolution formula is
different among nodes, giving the opportunity to new-coming nodes to dominate the system.
6There has been also a transformation of the external network, given the changes in the type of external
assets held by banks, but the study of the dynamics in this specific case is set aside in this paper.
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1.1.4 Baseline and summary assumptions.
We will extend the analysis already developed in previous literature (Tasca and Battiston, 2013)
by building a model that captures the borrower-lender relationships within the financial network
and the dynamics of the market in a context of heterogeneity among agents. After deriving a
leverage formula capturing all these interactions, we will proceed to estimate the response of
leverage dynamics in the banking system to an exogenous shock in external asset prices, given
different market conditions. These conditions will be captured by factors such as agents’ initial
leverage and target leverage levels, the depth of cross-holdings among financial institutions, etc.
Our model differs from existing models analysing systemic risk within a context of balance
sheet amplification mechanism in a number of ways. We firstly introduce heterogeneity by con-
sidering a financial system represented as a network of heterogeneous and interacting
agents. We also present a simple agent-based model of this heterogeneous financial system.
The aim is to capture the fact that micro-level agents’ interactions lead to macro-level complex
dynamics.
On the purpose of analysing the propagation mechanism of financial distress, different and
sequential approaches will be followed.
At first, we delve into the (accounting) dependence of one agent’s leverage on counterpar-
ties’ leverage and external asset prices, in order to get explicitly analytical foundation to
overlap and contagion issues. In doing so, we follow two different approaches regarding the
valuation of securities traded within the interbank network:
– According to the approach generally adopted in empirical finance, we initially consider
the book value of interbank liabilities -as a proxy for its market value- and the marked-
to-market value of internal assets.
– Then, as in finance theory, leverage will be couched in terms of the present market
value of both both interbank assets and liabilities.
We will see that the chosen method affects the results of the analysis of the static equilib-
rium in a leveraged system.
Subsequently, we study the properties of the dynamic equilibrium. We consider different
adjustment models capturing the leverage dynamics.
Secondly, we develop an agent-based model that allows for testing the conclusions drawn
from the analysis of the static and dynamic equilibrium:
– Different valuations of leverage lead to different potential equilibriums.
– The existence of an equilibrium is ultimately strongly affected by the structure of
balance sheets, i.e., by the level of leverage of the system.
– In order to ensure a systemic equilibrium, the choice of leverage ratios by macropru-
dential authorities should be based on the actual structure.
and for supplying the limitations of that analysis, by enabling:
– The assessment of some relationships among variables, that can be ambiguous when
working with linearised systems.
– The evaluation of effects of macro-prudential policies.
– The analysis of the dependence of the existence of an equilibrium on market structures
and conditions (network structure, banks’ capitalization...).
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In this context, a demand endogenous process governing bank’s decisions about external
asset holdings is incorporated7. Our simulations capture the fact that an exogenous shock
to external asset prices triggers balance sheet dynamics impacting leverage and leading to
a contagion process.
Balance sheet dynamics impacting leverage will be triggered by an exogenous shock to
external asset prices, leading to a contagion process that will be simulated.
According to different leverage scenarios, a Balance Sheet Managem ent process (BSM)
will be activated, allowing for financial amplification.
In order to extend the existing research and to come through a more realistic model when
considering specifically sovereign debt, some assumptions should be done:
• As said previously, we are not considering an homogeneous financial system, but heteroge-
neous players with different balance sheets structures8. For instance, the initial exposure
to assets related to real economy differ among banks.
• We allow for heterogeneity in terms of the external asset9.
• The asset market is considered complete, as banks can use financial instruments in order
to mitigate the credit risk.
• Notional value of interbank debts will remain constant over time: bi,t = bi.10
• Equity remains ”sticky”. Equity behaves like the pre-determined variable and the asset
size in the balance sheet will be endogenously chosen according to the degree of leverage
allowable given the market conditions (Adrian and Shin, 2011).
• Regarding the leverage targets, we analytically study the case of both heterogeneous and
homogeneous targets. The latter approach would be consistent with the introduction of a
leverage ratio according to Basel III regulatory framework.
A bank’s degree of reaction to asset-price changes is measured by the level of compliance
with own target leverage or capital requirements. We assess how leverage dynamics are
affected by the rate of adjustment to the target leverage in certain scenarios in order to
establish a connection with the part of the literature supporting the suitability of imposing
counter-cyclical capital requirements.
7We disregard the effect of trading movements on prices and any consequent endogenous price process.
8Even if banks in this heterogeneous network could be grouped by homogeneous parameters, creating a sort
of market microstructures.
9Actually, sovereign debt exhibits heterogeneity in prices (return) and volatility. Additionally, it cannot be
asserted that external assets are uncorrelated and have the same initial values. From an empirical point of view,
correlation in sovereign debt has been observed in European peripheral countries, and also the price at which the
debt is issued diverges among countries.
10Our interest is focused on the spillover effects of the sovereigns in the banking sector. We consider interbank
relationships as transmission channels, but we are not going in depth into the dynamics.
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1.2 The model
1.2.1 The interbank network.
We consider a financial system represented by a finite set of N individual banks interconnected
through financial contracts on the interbank market.
For this population of banks we define a network (N, g), where g is the set of all directed links
among heterogeneous banks. The index i indicates each individual bank, which can be either a
lender or a borrower. The index j indicates the counterparty of each bank in a trading relation-
ship within the interbank network.
A link between two nodes is denoted by gij , with gij = 1 if there exists an edge from i to j, or
otherwise, gij = 0 if there is no edge. The graph (N,g) is associated with a weight matrix, W
(column-stochastic matrix), where wi,j > 0 iff gij = 1, wi,j being wi,j the exposure of agent i to
agent j (
∑
j wi,j = 1).
By exposure we mean the quantity percentage of debt issued by bank j and held by bank i. Node
”i” will be exposed to node ”j” from a lender prospective, as long as the value of the liabilities
of agent j to i (i’s claims) depend on j’s ability to meet her obligation.
As in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), we assume that all nominal claims will be nonnegative and
that no node has a nominal claim against itself. In our design, this is equivalent to specify that
the weight matrix is non-negative and that all of the diagonal elements of the matrix are equal
to 0:
wi,j ≥ 0;wi,i = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N
We define Ni(g) = {j ∈ N |gi,j 6= 0} as the neighbourhood of i, that is, as the set of banks
with whom bank i has a direct link representing a credit relationship in the network.
The cardinality of this set is given by the degree of node i, expressed as:
di = |Ni(g)|, di ≤ N − 1
We could also define:
• The “out-degree” of node i as the number of out-going edges representing bank i’s lending
to counterparties within the interbank network:
d¯i = |N¯i(g)|, d¯i ≤ N − 1, N¯i(g) = {j ∈ N |wi,j 6= 0}
• The “in-degree” of node i as the number of of in-going edges representing bank i’s borrowing
from counterparties within the interbank network:
di = |Ni(g)|, Ni(g) = {j ∈ N |wi,j 6= 0}
We are not neccessary imposing a fully connected network; we could eventually allow for
incomplete networks. According to Allen and Gale (2000), the incompleteness of the network
would allow for financial fragility. They showed that financial contagion through credit linkages
among banks depends on the topology of the network: the higher the interconnectedness, the
lower the systemic risk. Nevertheless, other works have shown that the role of diversification can
be ambiguous in the presence of amplification mechanisms (Battiston et al., 2011; Gai, Haldane
and Kapadia, 2011).
We consider a static network11, and banks are endowed with bilateral claims, defined ex-ante.
11An alternative model of dynamic networks is included in appendix B.
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1.2.2 A bank’s balance sheet.
As said before, banks interact not only with other banks within the interbank market, but also
with agents external to the interbank market. Therefore, the stylized balance sheet of a bank at
time t can be represented as follows12:
Bank i
Assets Liabilities
K∑
k=1
nik,tpk,t di,t
bi,t
d¯i∑
j=1
ωij
bj,t
(Rt+ξj,tλj,t)tˆ
ei,t
Where:
nik bank i’s holdings of external asset ”k”
pk external asset price
di bank i’s external liabilities
bi bank i’s interbank liabilities (book value)
ei bank i’s equity∑
j
ωij
bj
(R+ξjλj)tˆ
bank i’s holdings of interbank obligations (market value)
From now on, we assume that there is only one type of interbank debt13, with same seniority
and maturity, tˆ = 1.
We make a distinction within assets and liabilities according to the sector of the counterparties
entering a financial relationship:
• internal assets and liabilities, traded within the interbank market.
• external assets and liabilities, traded between the bank and an agent in the rest of the
economy (in the private or public sector).
Defining bank i’s external assets as the sum of bank i’s claims against agents in the real sector
-private or public (sovereigns)-, the market value of external assets held by bank i at time t is:
K∑
k=1
nik,tpk,t
12Instead of considering a classification of the components of the balance sheet according to maturity -short
and long-term assets and liabilities-, we will categorize securities depending on the sector of the counterparties
involved in the trading.
Liquidity is not specified in this stylised balance sheet structure.
13The market value of debt is usually more difficult to obtain directly, since many firms (banks) may hold
non-traded debt, which would be specified in book value terms but not market value terms. A simple way to
convert book value debt into market value debt is to treat the entire debt on the books as one coupon bond, with
a coupon set equal to the interest expenses on all the debt and the maturity set equal to the face-value weighted
average maturity of the debt, and then to value this coupon bond at the current cost of debt for the bank.
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Defining bank i’s internal assets as the bank i’s claims against other banks, the market value
of internal assets held by bank i at time t is14:
d¯i∑
j=1
ωij
bj,t
Rt + ξj,tλj,t
where
ωi,j the exposure of bank i to j, defined previously
bj the nominal value of bank j’s total debt
1
R+ξjλi
the discount factor used in the computation of the present value of tˆ-years (tˆ = 1)
maturity obligations
R = 1 + rf , rf being the market risk-free rate
We have defined the return on bank j’s obligations as the aggregation of the risk-free rate
rf and a risk premium or credit spread ξjλj , that depends on the market perception of the
bank’s risk ξj and is proportional to her leverage λj
15. The rate of return on bank j’s obligations
towards bank i, rj = rf + ξjλj , increases with the level of leverage (is decreasing with financial
robustness).
We define the leverage of a bank as the ratio of total assets to equity, which in turn is defined
as the difference between the value of the bank’s portfolio of claims and its liabilities16.
1.2.3 Leverage.
Given the balance sheet structure considered above, our general expression for leverage is given
by:
λit =
∑
k
nik,tpk,t +
∑
j
ωij
bj,t
Rt+ξj,tλj,t(∑
k
nik,tpk,t +
∑
j
ωij
bj,t
Rt+ξj,tλj,t
)
− (di,t + bi,t)
(1.1)
which captures the overlapping structure of the financial system. By specifying the present
values of interbank obligations, bank i’s leverage is expressed as a function of all the obligors’
leverages λj,t, j = 1, ..., d¯i:
λi,t = λ(λ1,t, λ2,t, ..., λd¯i,t)
More precisely, it is the value of one bank’s internal asset that depends on the obligors’ lever-
age, i.e., on the strength of the borrowers’ balance sheets. The marked-to-market value of one
bank’s claims against other banks depends on the financial robustness of the latter17.
1.1 is a system of N non-linear equations in the level of leverage for each and every agent
i = 1, 2, ..., N , given the exposure to external agents
∑
k nikpk and individual liabilities di and
bi.
In order to better analyse the effects of price shocks on leverage, these equations are linearised.
The ultimate objective is to get a system of equations of the form λi,t = λ(pk,t, λ
∗).
14Hereafter, for the sake of simplicity upper and lower bounds of the summations will be omitted. It remains
understood that, in the summation for external assets, the index ranges from 1 to K, and that, in the summation
for counterparties, it varies within 1and N-1.
15 ξj ∈ [0, 1]could be understood as the reactivity of the rate of return to a bank’s financial condition.
16In Tasca and Battiston (2012), the leverage ratio is defined as a bank’s debt-to-assets ratio.
17The financial robustness is proxied by the equity ratio, defined as the inverse of the leverage ratio we consider:
1/λi, λi ∈ [1,∞).
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Individual leverage depends directly on counterparties’ leverage, but also indirectly on the
own level of leverage, as other banks’ leverage depend on the former18. So individual leverage
could be to some extent understood as a function of systemic leverage.
1.2.3.1 Target Leverage
The premise for the following analysis is that the level of leverage of a bank at a certain point
in time does not necessary correspond to the bank’s target leverage.
Previous literature provides evidence that firms -banks, in our case- follow leverage targets
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Flannery and
Rangan, 2006 and Lemmon et al., 2008). The results differ regarding the speed of adjustment
and the relative importance of targeting behaviour but the finding that firms actively rebalance
capital structure in order to close the gap between the current and the targeted leverage appears
robust.
There can be several reason for the leverage target to arise, for instance as a consequence of the
imposition of macroprudential regulation -leverage ratio- or due to internal risk management
leading banks to adopt a constraint based on the Value-at-Risk.
Value -at-Risk19 has been identified as a driver in financial intermediaries’ procyclical leverage
policy (Adrian and Shin, 2013). Banks actively shed risks through adjustments on leverage in
reaction to changing economic conditions. Even if banks can in principle react to an increase
in market risk by either raising more capital or by cutting back their asset exposures, empirical
evidence has exposed that they tend to do the latter. Equity is said to be relatively ”sticky” in
this sense (Adrian and Shin, 2011).
Along the lines of Adrian and Shin (2013), we can assume that leveraged banks adjust their
balance sheets so as to maintain their Value-at-Risk, Vi, equal to their equity, ei, as part of their
risk management policy. This behaviour can be approximated by the so-called Value-at-Risk
rule: Vi = ei, and it is equivalent to targeting a reference leverage.
Being vi the unit VaR or VaR per dollar of assets, and ai the total assets of bank i, we have
from the previous rule that ei = vi ∗ ai. This implies that bank i’s leverage target satisfies:
λTi =
1
vi
VaR is expected to be low in economic booms and low in busts, while (marked-to-market)
leverage is typically high during expansions and low during recessions (Adrian and Shin, 2011).
Empirical evidence suggests, as documented by Adrian and Shin (2010), that marked-to-
market financial intermediaries’ leverage is procyclical. Leveraged agents manage actively their
balance sheets in response to fluctuations in asset prices, so during booms an expansion of bal-
ance sheets materialises as financial intermediaries expand both the assets and the liabilities
sides. Analogously, during bursts banks shrink their balance sheets by contracting both the
assets and the liabilities sides.
We are considering the following amplification mechanism: shocks in external asset prices set
off a balance sheet management process that could lead to further feedback effects affecting the
value of holdings of external assets, as banks adjust the quantity of externa securities in their
balance sheets. The intensity of this process depends on the initial level of leverage.
18We will face systems of leverage functions to be solved simultaneously.
19The Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a quantile measure of the loss distribution defined as the expected maximum
loss of a risky asset or portfolio over a defined period for a given confidence interval.
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That’s to say, an initial shock in external assets prices can be amplified by asset market dynam-
ics. In this case, the propagation factor will be the leverage and the higher the leverage, the
higher the reaction.
Our model assumes that the banks adjust dynamically the actual level of leverage to a target.
The distance from target could be defined as the absolute distance between the target leverage
and the current leverage at the beginning of the period. We assume that the level at the beginning
of one period is equal to the level of leverage at the end of the previous period. The logic in
our model works as follows: the shock affecting the level of leverage takes place in one period,
the adjustment of leverage will take place either during the following period, if considering full
adjustment with a period, or during the following periods, if considering partial adjustment, as
we will see.
12
1.3 The analysis of overlapping portfolios and leverage.
In order to analyse the propagation mechanism of financial distress, we firstly consider static
nominal aggregates in banks’ balance sheets and study analytically how the overlap structure
works.
Distinct approaches are used to study in detail the relations among overlapping portfolios,
depending on whether we express the market value of interbank debt by using the book or the
marked-to-market value of interbank liabilities.
The determination of the systemic equilibrium is affected by the valuation methodology adopted:
different measures of leverage lead to different leverage functions and, consequently, to different
equilibriums. The chosen analytic approach will influence the results regarding both comparative
statics and dynamic behaviour of leverage.
Given the analytical difficulty of studying the N-banks case, we would consider a complete and
regular network and perform first the analysis on a financial system consisting of N-symmetric
banks, subsequently moving on to a two-banks case.
1.3.1 Market value of assets, book value of liabilities.
In this section, we consider the marked-to-market value of internal assets and the book value of
liabilities when defining the assets-to-equity ratio.
1.3.1.1 N-symmetric banks with regular and complete network.
When performing the analysis in a model of N-banks with symmetric balance sheets, we assume:
• Only one type of external assets, nk.
• The amount of the external liabilities is given: di = d.
• Interbank debt is given: bi = b.
• Interbank exposure is uniform: ωij = 1N−1 .
• Market perception of an agent’s risk is uniform: ξi = ξ.
The balance sheet of bank i is:
Bank i
Assets Liabilities
pknk di = d
bi = b
li = l ei = e
The leverage of bank i is20
λi =
pknk +
1
N−1 (N − 1) bR+ξλ
pknk +
1
N−1 (N − 1) bR+ξλ − (d+ b)
(1.2)
20The expression for leverage won’t depend on the size of the network.
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Rearranging and simplifying we get:
λi =
pknk +
b
R+ξλ
pknk + b
(
1−(R+ξλ)
R+ξλ
)
− d
(1.3)
According to equation 1.3, the individual leverage λi is a function of ”average” leverage λ
21.
. It is easy to see that λi is increasing in λ as shown by the individual leverage curves in figure
1.2. The concavity of the individual leverage curves can not be assessed a priori, as the curvature
of the leverage function depends on the particular balance sheet composition. For the leverage
curve to be concave, it must hold ni,kpk > di + bi.
(a) Concave leverage curves (b) Convex leverage curves
Figure 1.2: N-symmetric banks case: accounting equilibrium leverage.
The symmetry condition is
λi = λ (1.4)
Substituting 1.4 in 1.3 we get the quadratic expression
λ2 [ξ (nkpk − d− b)] + λ [(R− ξ)nkpk −R(d+ b) + b]− (Rnkpk + b) = 0 (1.5)
The solutions of equation 1.5 are the coordinates of points E1 and E2, i.e., the points of
intersection between the individual leverage curve and the 45-degree line. Of course only the
positive solution is economically meaningful. λE is the equilibrium leverage, i.e. the individual
(and average) leverage in a complete regular network with identical banks.
Point E brings about consistency between the individual and the average leverage.
When λ is smaller than λE (see point A on the leverage curve), individual leverage would be
grater than average: λi
0 > λ0. This is true for each and every bank. Hence average leverage
must be bigger than λ0. Only at point E there is consistency (and symmetry). Furthermore,
in the context of banks targeting a reference leverage λi
T , λi
E = λi
T must hold to ensure that
consistency.
Changes in exogenous variables will make the leverage curve shift and therefore will generate
a new symmetric consistent equilibrium (see figure 1.3 and 1.4).
21The analysis of the symmetric case leads to the same result regardless of the number of banks.
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(a) Increase in the value of the external asset (b) Decrease in the value of the external asset
Figure 1.3: Effects of shocks in exogenous variables, concave curves
(a) Increase in the value of the external asset (b) Decrease in the value of the external asset
Figure 1.4: Effects of shocks in exogenous variables, convex curves
Expression 1.5 is linearised to analyse the behaviour of the original non-linear equation around
a point λ∗. We impose λ∗ = λT 22. The final expression
λ =
(λ∗)2 [ξ (nkpk − d− b)] +Rnkpk + b
2λ∗ξ (nkpk − d− b) + (R− ξ) (nkpk)−R(d+ b) + b (1.6)
represents the coordinate of the intersection points on the 45-degree line.
The existence of the solution to equation 1.5 is subject to some conditions, as the expression
for the intersection point depends on the specific structure of the balance sheets. Therefore, it’s
not straightforward to come analytically to sound and general conclusions. For λ to be positive,
it must hold that:
nkpk > f(d, b, λ
∗) =
2λ∗ξ +R
ξ(2λ∗ − 1)Rd+
[
2λ∗ξ +R
ξ(2λ∗ − 1)R − 1
]
b > 1
For the purpose of delving into the static properties and effects of overlaps among bank
portfolios, we are interested in studying the behaviour of leverage, as defined in expression 1.6.
First, we measure the sensitivity of individual leverage to changes in the target leverage. We
22As we are considering fully-leveraged banks, we are interesting in understanding the behaviour of leverage
near the equilibrium, λT .
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expect bank i’s leverage to be a positive function of the target leverage. After calculating the
partial derivative of one bank’s leverage with respect to this target, we obtain that this derivative
is positive only if the market value of external assets is greater than a term proportional to the
value of total debt (with the coefficient of proportionality larger than 1).
In addition, leverage is inversely related to external asset prices, i.e., decreases in external assets
prices lead to increases in leverage.
1.3.1.2 2-banks framework.
We now proceed to study analytically the mechanism of overlap on a financial system consist-
ing of two banks. As in the previous case, the system of non-linear equations given by 1.1 is
linearised, being i = 1, 2 now. By solving the system, the intersection of the linearised leverage
curves are found and the feasible equilibrium points are identified, therefore.
For the system to be in an accounting-consistent equilibrium, λi = λi
E must hold in the
two-banks case too. As shown in figure 1.16, if the initial individual level of leverage λi
0 is
different from the equilibrium leverage λi
E , there would be no consistency as the counterpartie’s
accountant leverage λ′−i and the effective one, λ0−i will not coincide. So point E is the only
feasible point ensuring consistency between individual leverages23.
Figure 1.5: 2-banks case: accounting equilibrium.
Henceforward, we will keep some of the previous assumptions:
• Only one type of external assets, nk.
• Market perception of an agent’s risk is uniform: ξi = ξ.
23When fully-leveraged banks are pursuing a target leverage, the accounting equilibrium is given by an inter-
section vector of the form λi
∗ = λTi .
16
1.3.1.2.1 2-symmetric banks.
The analysis in this case is equivalent to the one conducted in the a financial network con-
sisting of N-symmetric banks.
We have previously assumed that λ∗ = λT and argued that only the condition λi = λEi
ensures consistency. In a system consisting of two symmetric banks, it is straightforward to see
that in the equilibrium λ∗ = λEi = λ
T must hold.
Only if the system is linearised around the point λi
∗ = λEi = λ
T is the existence of the
equilibrium -given by the intersection of the linearised curves- ensured. When leverage functions
are estimated near any other points (See points A and B in figure 1.6), the equilibrium could
be achieved at either significantly higher levels of leverage or at negative values for λi, that we
exclude by assumption.
Figure 1.6: Linearisation of leverage functions: consistent equlibrium.
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1.3.1.2.2 2-asymmetric banks.
The expression for leverage in the specific case of a banking system formed by two asymmetric
banks is24:
λi =
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλ2
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
(1.7)
As done previously, we study the behaviour of the leverage curves in the two-dimensional
coordinate plane.
The sensitivity of individual leverage to changes in the leverage of its obligor is given by the
following expression
∂λi
∂λj
=
ξbj
(R+ξλj)2
(di + bi)(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
)2 > 0 (1.8)
Bank i’s leverage is a positive function of i’s obligor one. Therefore, increases in counter-
parties’ leverage lead to increases in own leverage. Furthermore, this derivative is an expression
depending on the debt-to-equity ratio -an alternative measure for leverage25-, and it turns out
the higher the own leverage, the higher the response to changes in counterparties’ leverage.
From the analysis of the second derivative capturing the curvature of the leverage function,
∂2λi
∂λ2j
, it cannot be deduced a priori whether the change of the rate of change of bank i’s leverage
is increasing or decreasing in λj , as already shown. It would depend on whether the holdings of
external assets are smaller than total liabilities -convexity- or not -concavity-. That’s to say, on
whether the exposure to the interbank network is greater than equity or not.
The representation of the leverage curves in the phase plane could be as follows:
(a) Concave case (b) Convex case
Figure 1.7: Leverage curves
It should be noticed that, while concavity makes the existence of an intersection point more
probable, convexity doesn’t. It depends on the specific structure of the balance sheets, as already
seen.
24In this particular case,
∑
j
ωij = ω12 = ω21 = 1.
25The debt-to-equity ratio is a debt ratio closely related to leveraging that measures the riskiness of a company’s
(bank) financial structure
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The effects of the exposure to a counterparty debt, bj , on own-leverage responsiveness to
counterparties’ leverage cannot be assessed a priori, as well. Higher exposures will lead to
steeper leverage curves whenever the value of external assets net of internal assets is bigger that
the value of total liabilities: ni,kpk − bjR+ξλj > (di + bi).
On the contrary, it’s straightforward to state that the riskier the counterparty, i.e., the higher ξ,
the steeper the slope of the leverage curve. (For in-depth considerations, we refer the reader to
appendix A.1.1.)
Regarding the effect of shocks in external asset prices on leverage, captured by
∂λi
∂pk
=
−ni,k (bi + di)(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
)2 < 0 (1.9)
we deduce that leverage is inversely related to external asset prices. Moreover, the debt-to-
equity ratio defines the magnitude of D.7, meaning that the higher the leverage, the higher the
response to changes in external asset prices.
In addition, it’s observed that, for banks having more exposure to external than to internal
assets, nikpk − bjR+ξλj > di + bi, the higher the exposure to the external asset, the higher the
response of leverage to shocks in prices.
When solving the system of equations given by D.3, we face quadratic equations26 (Ap-
pendix A.1.2.). Should the system be linearised, consistency is verified only when linearisation
is performed around the point λi
∗ = λEi = λ
T . Whenever leverage functions are estimate near
any other points (See points A and B), inconsistency arises between effective and accounting
individual levels of leverage.
Figure 1.8: Linearisation of leverage functions: consistent equilibrium.
26The existence of real solutions depends on the sign of the expression ni,kpk − (di + bi).
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1.3.2 Market value of internal assets and liabilities.
Finance theory mainly focuses on the market value of debt, in contrast with the widespread use
of book value in empirical finance. Since most corporate debt is traded over the counter and
infrequently, market value of debt is usually more difficult to obtain directly.
In previous sections we have adopted the approach followed in empirical finance, by using
book value of interbank liabilities, bi, as a proxy for market value of interbank debt, and the
marked-to-market values of internal assets.
Given that within the interbank market in our model one bank’s liabilities are other banks’ as-
sets, being able to measure the market value of interbank assets means being capable of assessing
the market value of interbank debt. Therefore, in this section leverage will be couched in terms
of market value of both interbank assets and liabilities.
The general expression for leverage becomes
λit =
∑
k
nik,tpk,t +
∑
j
ωij
bj,t
R+ξλj,t(∑
k
nik,tpk,t +
∑
j
ωij
bj,t
R+ξλj,t
)
−
(
di,t +
bi,t
R+ξλi,t
) (1.10)
1.3.2.1 N-symmetric banks with regular and complete network.
Keeping the assumptions made in section 3.1.1, the expression for leverage in this case is given
by
λi =
nkpk +
b
R+ξλ
nkpk − d (1.11)
Substituting 1.4 in 1.11 solving for λ we get the following quadratic expression:
λ2 [ξ (nkpk − d)] + λ [R (nkpk − d)− ξnkpk]− (Rnkpk + b) = 0 (1.12)
that could be linearised following a Taylor approximation around λ∗. The final expression
results:
λ =
(λ∗)2 [ξ (nkpk − d)] +Rnkpk + b
2λ∗ξ (nkpk − d) +R (nkpk − d)− ξnkpk (1.13)
As previously explained, the solutions of equation 1.13 are the coordinates of the equilibrium
points λE bringing out consistency between either the individual and average leverage (N banks),
or individual levels of leverage (2 banks). In addition, the existence of an economic-meaningful
solution depends on the structure of the balance sheet and will be ensured when the following
condition holds
nkpk > f(d, λ
∗) =
2λ∗ξ +R
ξ(2λ∗ − 1) +Rd
In this scenario, leverage is increasing in the target level as well, provided that the market value
of external assets is greater than the value of external debt, i.e., the bank has to be creditor with
respect to the the external network.
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1.3.2.2 2-asymmetric banks.
Recalling the expression for leverage given by equation 1.10 and the assumptions previously
made regarding the uniqueness of the external asset and the uniformity of risk perception, the
leverage of bank i is
λi =
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
−
(
di +
bi
R+ξλi
) (1.14)
so the banking system of 2-asymmetric banks is represented by a set of non-linear equations
[ξ (Ni − di)− 1]λ2i + [Ni (R− ξ)− diR]λi −NiR = 0 (1.15)
The system of quadratic expressions given by equation 1.15 is solved using the first order
term27 of the Taylor expansions around a point λ∗ = (λ∗1, λ
∗
2) = (λ
T
1 , λ
T
2 ).
We distinguish between two cases, depending on whether the target leverage is the same for both
banks or not.
1.3.2.2.1 Linearisation around λ∗, general case: λ∗1 6= λ∗2.
By linearising 1.15, and after some algebra, we have a system of two linear equations with 2
unknowns, λ1, λ2, that can be solved for λ1 and λ2, respectively:
λ1 = f (λ2, λ
∗, pk) =
([
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ ξλ∗2
]
[ξ (2λ∗1 − 1) +R]− 2λ∗1 (ξd1 + 1)− d1R
)−1
[
λ∗2
ξb2
(R+ ξλ∗2)
2 (R− λ∗1 [ξλ∗1 + (R− ξ)])−(λ∗1)2
[
1 + ξd1 − ξ
(
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ ξλ∗2
)]
+R
(
n1,kpk +
b2
(R+ ξλ∗2)
)
+ λ2
ξb2
(R+ ξλ∗2)
2 (R− λ∗1 [ξλ∗1 + (R− ξ)])
]
(1.16)
λ2 = g (λ1, λ
∗, pk) =
([
n2,kpk +
b1
R+ ξλ∗1
]
[ξ (2λ∗2 − 1) +R]− 2λ∗2 (ξd2 + 1)− d2R
)−1
[
λ∗1
ξb1
(R+ ξλ∗1)
2 (R− λ∗2 [ξλ∗2 + (R− ξ)])−(λ∗2)2
[
1 + ξd2 − ξ
(
n2,kpk +
b1
R+ ξλ∗1
)]
+R
(
n2,kpk +
b1
(R+ ξλ∗1)
)
+ λ1
[
ξb1
(R+ ξλ∗1)
2 (R− λ∗2 [ξλ∗2 + (R− ξ)])
]]
(1.17)
When solving the previous system, we get expressions of the form λ1 = F (λ
∗, pk) and λ2 =
G(λ∗, pk). (See Appendix A.2.1 for further details).
27Second order and higher terms will contribute little to the sum.
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1.3.2.2.2 Linearisation around λ∗, general case: λ∗ = λ∗1 = λ
∗
2.
The target leverage for both banks being identical could be equivalent to the imposition of a
macroprudential leverage ratio, for instance.
In that case, we get a system of equations λ (λi, λj) as follows:
f (λ1, λ2) ≈
λ1
([
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ ξλ∗
]
[ξ (2λ∗ − 1) +R]− 2λ∗ (ξd1 + 1)− d1R
)
+λ2
[
ξb2
(R+ ξλ∗)2
(R− λ∗ [ξλ∗ + (R− ξ)])
]
+ (λ∗)2
[
1 + ξd1 − ξ
(
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ ξλ∗
)]
− λ∗ ξb2
(R+ ξλ∗)2
(R− λ∗ [ξλ∗ + (R− ξ)])
−R
(
n1,kpk +
b2
(R+ ξλ∗)
)
= 0 (1.18)
g (λ1, λ2) ≈
λ2
([
n2,kpk +
b1
R+ ξλ∗
]
[ξ (2λ∗ − 1) +R]− 2λ∗ (ξd2 + 1)− d2R
)
+λ1
[
ξb1
(R+ ξλ∗)2
(R− λ∗ [ξλ∗ + (R− ξ)])
]
+ (λ∗)2
[
1 + ξd2 − ξ
(
n2,kpk +
b1
R+ ξλ∗
)]
− λ∗ ξb1
(R+ ξλ∗)2
(R− λ∗ [ξλ∗ + (R− ξ)])
−R
(
n2,kpk +
b1
(R+ ξλ∗1)
)
= 0 (1.19)
, from which we we can deduce expressions of the form λi = λ(λ
∗, pk), that are expressed in
terms of differences of holdings (of external/internal assets and liabilities) between banks (See
appendix A.2.2.).
When studying the behaviour of non-linear leverage curves given by expression 1.14, we find
bank i’s leverage is a positive function of i’s obligor one, and is inversely related to external asset
prices, as expected. Additionally, it’s immediate to see that the value of already-issued own
debt valued at market prices decreases as the financial robustness of the issuer deteriorates. The
bigger bank i’s leverage, the smaller the present value of i’s interbank liabilities, as own leverage
enters the expression of the rate at which the value of interbank debt is discounted. Hence, the
weight of own liabilities in the balance sheet diminishes28.
However, the sign of the relations mentioned above is ambiguous for expressions of the form
λi = λi(pk, λ
∗) resulting from linearisation. Regarding the response of leverage to changes in
counterparties’ leverage, additional conditions must hold in order to have the expected results.
For instance, the corresponding derivative is positive provided that the value of total assets is
higher than a term proportional to external funds in the case λ∗1 6= λ∗2:
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ ξλ∗
>
2λ∗(ξdi + 1) +Rdi
ξ(2λ∗ − 1) +R (1.20)
28The rate at which the interbank debt in the books has been issued is in any case lower than the one of new
issuances given the financial deterioration of the issuer.
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while in the case λ∗1 = λ
∗
2, λ
∗ must additionally lie within the interval [R,∞]. Given the
complexity of the linearised equations, the derivatives with respect the target leverage and the
external asset price are hard to be assessed analytically.
We can perform additional analysis within the scenario λ1 = λ2 = λ
∗ -equivalent to the ap-
plication of macro prudential policy-, considering different lending profile of banks and different
investment strategies. We refer the reader to appendix A.2.4 for the study of theses cases.
Also, an alternative approach to the analysis of leverage behaviour in the presence of sym-
metry is provided in Appendix C.
1.4 Modelling leverage dynamics
This section studies the dynamics of leverage. As in the model of Banerjee, Heshmati, and
Wihlborg (2000), we assume that the actual capital structure of a firm at a particular time does
not necessarily equal the target capital structure of that firm. Firms -banks, in our case- adjust
dynamically their capital structures -leverage- to a target.
1.4.1 The adjustment model
In the optimum, the leverage of a firm will equal its target leverage (de Haas and Peeters, 2004).
Nevertheless, given some market circumstances, the adjustment to that target may not necessary
be immediate. This adjustment can be expressed using discrete dynamics as follows:
λi,t − λi,t−1 = i,t
(
λTi,t−1 − λi,t−1
)
(1.21)
or analogously
λi,t = (1− i,t)λi,t−1 + i,tλTi,t−1 (1.22)
where λTi,t is bank’ i’s target leverage at time t and i,t is the adjustment speed during one
period. If i,t = 1, full adjustment is achieved within one period. Consequently, leverage at the
end of the period will be equal to the beginning-of-period target: λi,t = λ
T
i,t−1.
In our case, the speed of adjustment depends on the distance between the target leverage
and the actual leverage at the beginning of the period: |λTi,t−λi,t−1|. In this way, we endogenize
to some extent this parameter and also allow not only for adjustment across periods but for
heterogeneity. The speed of adjustment will vary in time and differ among banks, given their
target leverages and the actual levels of leverage affected by external-assets prices shocks.
Empirical evidence supports the existence of different rates of adjustment towards a target
leverage among firms: over and under leveraged firms will adjust toward their targets at different
rates, due bankruptcy costs, see e.g. Hovakimian et al. (2001), Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins,
and Smith (2007). As shown in Elliott, Ko?ter-Kant and Warr (2008), firms above their optimal
target hit a ”hard” boundary and those that are below their target face a ”soft” boundary, which
translates to more rapid rates of adjustment for firms above their target, relative to those below
their target.
We are not interested in the absolute distance between the target and the actual leverage, but
in the sign of this magnitude, in order to establish whether a bank is over or under leveraged.
Since this distance from target is calculated as the target leverage minus the observed, over-
leveraged institutions will have a negative value for distance, whereas it will be positive for
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under-leveraged ones.
As shown in equation 1.21, the adjustment during the current period is made on the basis of
previous-period values. If the coefficient on distance equals 1, the bank will return to its target
debt ratio in the following period,. Otherwise, it is the case of a partial adjustment and there will
not be immediate adjustment. The value of the parameter  capturing the bank’s promptness
in adjusting leverage deviations from target lies within the range [0,1].
Previous empirical work on partial adjustment models evidencing firms’s mean reverting be-
haviour toward a leverage target suggests not only that over leveraged firms revert more rapidly
to the target leverage, but also that under leveraged firms adjust toward their target leverage at
less than half the rate of over leveraged firms (Elliott, Ko?ter-Kant and Warr, 2008).
Asymmetries in the adjustment processes could be captured by setting different values for
the adjustment parameter, depending on whether the bank is under or over leveraged.
For the sake of simplicity, a value of 1 could be assigned to the adjustment parameter of over
leveraged banks, and of 0,5 in the case of under leveraged ones. So banks with a negative distance
would adjust at a faster rate (reducing 100 % of the distance from their target per period) than
banks with positive distance (reducing 50 % of the distance per period). That’s to say, for over
leveraged banks full adjustment would be achieved within a period, while under leveraged banks
would accomplish partial adjustments.
i,t =
{
1 if λTi,t − λi,t < 0
0.5 if λTi,t − λi,t > 0
1.4.1.1 Qualitative analysis
We now study the stability properties of the system given by the expression of the adjustment
discrete dynamics in the case of two banks.
Initially, we don’t account for interdependency of balance sheets. Later on, we analyse the
dynamics considering overlap29.
1.4.1.1.1 Book-value-based leverage ratio.
What we have is an autonomous first-order nonhomogeneous dynamic discrete system given
by expression 1.22. We are assuming an exogenous target leverage, being λTi,t = λ
T
i a parameter
set at time 0. In the case of two banks30:
λ1,t = (1− 1)λ1,t−1 + 1λT1 (1.23)
λ2,t = (1− 2)λ2,t−1 + 2λT2 (1.24)
or
[
λ1,t
λ2,t
]
=
[
1− 1 0
0 1− 2
] [
λ1,t−1
λ2,t−1
]
+
[
1λ
T
1
2λ
T
2
]
(1.25)
29We will simulate the system considering fully-leveraged banks affected by a shock in external asset prices
30Given that i,t is set whenever the leverage gap is not zero, it is considered as a constant during the periods
affected by the adjustment process.
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The equilibrium solution for the previous system is:
λ∗i = λ
T
i (1.26)
, being i = 1, 2. Once we have established that an equilibrium exists, we solve the system in
order to study its stability. Considering the system in terms of deviations from equilibrium,
λi,t − λ∗i = (1− i)(λi,t−1 − λ∗) (1.27)
after solving for the eigenvalues r = 1 − 2 and s = 1 − 131 and finding the associated
eigenvectors, we have that the solution would be:
λi,t = λ
∗
i (1.28)
It would be interesting to represent the previous system in its canonical form in order to call
attention to the fact that, even if not having specified so far the expression for a bank’s leverage as
a function of their counterparties’ leverage, the solution for λi,t depends on parameters regarding
the counterparty, such as the counterparty’s adjustment rate and initial leverage.
zi,t = (1− j)tλj,0 (1.29)
But we can gain insight into the dynamics of this system by looking at the phase plane.
Considering the following system outlining discrete changes in λ1 and λ2:
4λ1,t = 1(λT1 − λ1,t−1) (1.30)
4λ2,t = 2(λT2 − λ2,t−1) (1.31)
We have already established that in equilibrium 4λ1,t = 0; 4λ2,t = 0, so λ∗1 = λT1 and
λ∗2 = λ
T
2 , and the isoclines in the phase plane are given by λ1,t−1 = λ
T
1 and λ2,t−1 = λ
T
2 , respec-
tively.
Considering now points either side the isoclines: to the left (right) of the isocline 4λ1,t = 0,
variable λ1,t−1 is increasing (decreasing); and below (above) the isocline 4λ2,t = 0, variable
λ1,t−1 is increasing (decreasing).{
4λ1,t > 0⇒ λ1,t−1 < λT1
4λ1,t < 0⇒ λ1,t−1 > λT1{
4λ2,t > 0⇒ λ2,t−1 < λT2
4λ2,t < 0⇒ λ2,t−1 > λT2
By drawing these vector forces in our phase plane, it can be observed that regardless of the
initial point, the system moves towards the equilibrium point where the two isoclines intersect:
(λ∗1, λ
∗
2) = (λ
T
1 , λ
T
2 ) (See fig. 1.9).
31As |r| < 1 and |s| < 1 the system is expected to be dynamically stable.
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Figure 1.9: Adjustment model: Phase plane -book value-
1.4.1.1.2 Market-value-based leverage ratio.
When considering the marked-to-market leverage ratio, we have that λi,t−1 is a function
F (λi,t−1, λ−i,t−1).
It is possible to investigate the stability properties of this nonlinear system in the neighbour-
hood of the steady state as long as F is continuous and differentiable.Under such conditions the
system can be linearised around one of the equilibrium points. The system we are studying has
a fixed point at (λ∗1, λ
∗
2) given by the condition λi = λ
T
i .
As we are considering marked-to-market leverage, λi can be substituted by the corresponding
expression capturing the overlap among banks’ portfolios. By doing so, we find new values for
the fixed points, considering this time the effect of counterparties’ leverage on the bank’s own
leverage. What can be derived from the resulting expression is that the value of one bank’s
leverage in the equilibrium depends on the counterparties’ leverage target.
To compute the linear stability of the system we derive the Jacobian of the dynamical system
and study the values of the resulting eigenvalues. As we have enough information about the
functions F (λi,t−1, λ−i,t−1), we can determine the characteristics of the equilibrium.
• When considering market value of assets, λi is replaced by the expression capturing the
dependency on cunterparty’s leverage, F (λ−i). The Jacobian is of the form:
J =
[
0 fλ2(λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2)
gλ1(λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2) 0
]
(1.32)
Given that both derivatives are positive, independently of the values of the equilibrium
point, the determinant of this Jacobian is negative. This gives us the intuition that the
equilibrium point is a saddle point in this case.
• When considering market value of assets an liabilities, λi is substituted by the correspond-
ing linearised quadratic expression , F (λ−i, λ∗i ). The Jacobian is given by:
J =
[
fλ1(λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2) fλ2(λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2)
gλ1(λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2) gλ2(λ
∗
1, λ
∗
2)
]
(1.33)
Given that all the derivatives are positive, independently of the values of the equilibrium
point, the determinant of this Jacobian will be positive, so does its trace. This gives us the
intuition that, independently of the sig of the discriminant, the equilibrium is unstable in
this case.
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So when introducing explicitly the dependancy of one bank’s leverage on their counterparties’
leverage, the dynamics of the model seem to become unstable.
1.4.1.1.2.1 An application to real systems with marked-to-market leverage
Consider now the case of a regulator setting a target leverage for the banking system. Ac-
cording to literature on leverage cycles, banks’ procyclical leverage policies destabilise the system
leading to systemic effects. A regulator can potentially correct for this systemic risk by imposing
a countercyclical policy consisting on allowing banks to vary their leverage in response to price
shocks32.
Regulator’s choice of the level of target leverage would be equivalent to setting λTi as a free
variable to be determined given our adjustment model. The logic behind this approach is to set
a target leverage according to the conditions of the market.
We have already seen how to expand a system of non-linear equations of the form λi,t =
λ(λj,t, pk,t) in a Taylor expansion around the point λ
T
i , which has turned out to be the equilib-
rium of the dynamic system λ∗i .
In order to establish a connection with the analysis of the intersection point already performed,
we now consider an unique common leverage target, λT = λ∗, and assume that the adjustment
speed i is equal to one. The non-linear dynamic system λi,t − λi,t−1 = i(λT1 − λi,t−1) be-
comes λi,t = λ
T
i (≡ λ∗i ). We can impose this condition on the linearised equations of the form
λi,t = λi(pk,t, λ
∗), and solve for λ∗.
By doing so, a common equilibrium target leverage would then be determined, considering the
real conditions of the banking sector.
Common knowledge of a target leverage and, therefore, capacity of perfect forecasting of
counterparties’ targets, allows for anticipation of others’ balance sheet adjustments and the
incorporation of these true expectations in own behaviour. Otherwise, as the leverage dynamics
model simulations proves, the existence of equilibrium can not be ensured.
1.4.2 An alternative adjustment model
In order to capture more accurately the effects of overlapping portfolios in the dynamics of the
system, it would be interesting to consider the following expression for the adjustment model:
4 λi,t = λi,t − λi,t−1 = i(λTi − λi,t−1)− ςi,−i,t−1Ei,t−1[−i(λT−i − λ−i,t−1)] (1.34)
where ςi,−i =
δλ1,t
δλ2,t
is the sensibility of bank i to changes on counterparty’s leverage, and the
term Ei,t−1[−i(λT−i − λ−i,t−1)] captures bank i’s expectations about the adapting behaviour of
their counterparties. For the sake of simplicity, we assume rational expectations
Ei,t−1[−i(λT−i − λ−i,t−1)] = [−i(λT−i − λ−i,t−1)]
and the parameters −i and ςi,−i,t−1 to be constant.
We do not explicitly specify the overlap issue in the expression for bank i’s leverage λi, but
it’s captured by the additional term. When closing the leverage gap, banks anticipate the effects
32In order to do so, in a scenario of decreasing external assets prices, for instance, the regulator could set a
target leverage higher than the ones present in the market, so banks don’t have to decrease their effective leverage
when pursuing to close the leverage gap.
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of the simultaneous adjustment on own leverage made by their counterparties and incorporate
them to their behaviour.
We now study the stability properties of the dynamic system given by 1.34 for the case of
two banks. Given
4 λi,t = i(λTi − λi,t−1)− ςi,jj(λTj − λj,t−1) (1.35)
we obtain the equilibrium values λ∗i = λ
T
i , i, j = 1, 2.
The isoclines are given by λ1,t−1 = 12ς1,2 [λ1,t−1−λT1 ]+λT2 and λ2,t−1 =
1ς2,1
2
[λ1,t−1−λT1 ]+λT2 ,
respectively.
Considering now points either side the isoclines: above the isocline 4λ1,t = 0, variable λ1,t−1
increases, whereas it decreases below. On the other hand, below the isocline 4λ2,t = 0, variable
λ2,t−1 increases, while it decreases above it.
When looking at the phase plane, the system presents two different stability behaviours.
Stability also depends on the relation between the slope of the system isoclines, determined
ultimately by the effect of changes in counterparty’s leverage, i.e., by the balance sheet structure:
• If the slope of the isocline given by 4λ1,t = 0, 12ς1,2 , is greater than the slope of isocline
given by 4λ2,t = 0, 1ς2,12 , the equilibrium would be an stable proper node, as in the
previous adjustment model when considering book-value-based leverage (See fig.1.10a).
• On the contrary, if the slope of the isocline given by 4λ2,t = 0 is greater than the slope
of isocline given by 4λ1,t = 0 we realise that the equilibrium point is an unstable saddle
point, so we would expect the system to move away from the equilibrium point, except for
initial values lying on the stable manifold (See fig.1.10b)33.
(a) Stable case (b) Unstable case
Figure 1.10: Adjustment model with overlapping portfolios: Phase plane -market value-.
In our case, the initial conditions are given by λ1,0 = λ
T
1 and λ2,0 = λ
T
2 , so the initial values
are those one in the equilibrium. Therefore, we expect the system to be stable in the presence
of rational expectations.
33Ultimately, these conditions depend on the structure of the balance sheet.
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1.4.2.1 Application to real systems
This last approach to the adjustment model would be particularly suitable when allowing for
changes in target leverage. Even if in our model the target leverage is treated as an exogenous
variable, it would be useful to study the case in which a shock in the target leverage takes place.
This could be the real case of a regulator -macroprudential supervisory authorities- updating the
target leverage for the banking system as part of the implementation of countercyclical policies.
It’s relevant to study the situation where we have as equilibrium an unstable saddle point.
Therefore, in terms of figure 1.10b, an increase in λT2 shifts both the 4λ1,t = 0 and 4λ2,t = 0
lines to the left, being the magnitude of the shift greater for the isocline 4λ1,t = 0-. On the
contrary, an increase in λT1 shifts both the 4λ1,t = 0 and 4λ2,t = 0 lines to the right by the
same magnitude. The system will reach a new equilibrium, and an adjustment from the first
equilibrium to the new one is expected (See fig. 1.11).
Figure 1.11: Countercyclical policy in the adjustment model
A shock away from the equilibrium won’t be corrected in the model unless the economy is in
the saddle path. Given the perfect foresight hypothesis, agents know that the economy will fall
apart in other case and they expect the economy to be in the saddle path. By this behaviour
this expectation is correct (Heijdra and Van der Ploeg, 2002).
A countercyclical policy produces an overshooting, allowing the system to converge to a new
equilibrium. An increase in the target leverage causes a leverage gap, so a balance-sheet man-
agement mechanism affecting external assets holdings is triggered. This initially results in an
increase in effective leverage, i.e., leverage overshoots as banks manage to close the leverage gap.
Each agent will increase his effective leverage in response to the increase in target leverage, ap-
proaching points E′0 and E
′′
0 in fig. 1.11, respectively. But banks perfectly predict the behaviour
of other banks, so they expect their counterparties to adjust simultaneously their effective lever-
ages, which will affect the former bank’s own level. Because of that, a gradual adjustment along
the saddle path SP1 leads to the economy back to the equilibrium E1. Hence, E1 must be
approached from a north-westerly direction in the case of bank 2, and from a south-easterly one
for bank 1.
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1.5 Leverage dynamics model simulation.
Classical literature has failed to predict some stylised dynamics of financial markets. The last
financial crises has posed the urgency of incorporating some crucial facts in order to delve into
the functioning of the financial system. It’s important to account for heterogeneity of financial
agents and products, for potential amplification and contagion mechanisms, as well as for dif-
ferent conditions of the financial markets, regarding liquidity, the level of leverage within the
system, regulation...
The incorporation of these elements in modelling becomes complicated within an analytical
framework or when employing the classical model approach based on a representative agent.
We develop a model representing leveraged interconnected banks taking positions in several
external securities.
In a financial system with interlinked claims and obligations, lenders and borrowers are inter-
connected through credit contracts, i.e., one party’s internal liabilities are other parties’ assets.
Therefore, not only direct effects of external asset price shocks are considered but also the prop-
agation effects through others’ exposures to banks affected directly by those shocks34.
Heterogeneity among agents and products is introduced through the holdings of external
assets, while we rely, on one hand, on the network diversification -d - and integration degree
-w - and, on the other, on system leverage levels, i.e. initial capitalization, to capture different
market conditions.
In our model, banks are performing at the level of committed leverage. Financial institutions
are fully-leveraged or strategic banks that actively manage their balance sheets in order to match
a target leverage. This target can be either individually determined by risk management models
(VaR), as seen before, or imposed by a policy regulator. By doing so, these agents pursue a
procyclical leverage policy. The initial condition for leverage for these agents is: λi,0 = λ
T
i .
We disregard the role of financial institutions as active traders, so that the adjustment to a
target leverage through variations in external assets won’t induce prices movements in the same
direction of the trading. Therefore, banks manage their balance sheets in response to asset price
movements, but no price taˆtonnement process is activated.
1.5.1 Some considerations on Balance Sheet Management.
Different circumstances can be identified as trigger for shocks in government debt prices. For in-
stance, an increase in interest rates causes the bond prices to fall, and, consequently, older bond
yields to increase, bringing them into line with newer bonds being issued with higher coupons.
So we can understand the shock in prices in our model as a consequence of new issues in the
case of sovereign’ robustness deterioration, which translates into higher interest rates.
There could be also market facts triggering debt price shocks, such as macroeconomic indicators
data releases indicating an economic deterioration (or recovery) in the issuer country (GDP...)
or rating agencies’ announcements.
In the case of fully-leveraged banks, leverage λi is initially set equal to λi
T (λi,0 = λi
T ) at a
given equilibrium price. Deviations of prices from this reference price on the asset side of banks’
balance sheets lead to changes in leverage, given that changes in prices induce greater changes
34The external network could be also considered as an additional source of connectivity among banks in the
sense that banks can be exposed to the same external assets and liabilities and, therefore, there will be overlaps
among portfolios of external holdings. Nevertheless, that is beyond the scope of this paper.
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in equity. Defining:
λ¯i,t =
∑
k nik,t−1pk,t +
∑
j
ωij
bj
R+ξj λ¯j,t
e¯i,t
in the presence of a shock to external assets prices, a δ% of change in prices from pk,t−1 to
pk,t causes a λ¯i,tδ% change in equity (Thurner et al., 2010). These changes in equity result in
surplus (ei,t > ei,t−1) or deficit (ei,t < ei,t−1) of capital that will affect external holdings.
Considering, for instance, a downward shock to the price of an specific external asset. At a
lower price fully-leveraged banks would start selling the external asset in order to adjust down
its leverage and close their leverage gap35.
If we were considering any price taˆtonnement process, in the absence of other players in
the market this would increase the supply of assets above demand, and the market price would
adjust to clear the market, pushing the prices further down. This is not captured in our model,
where the positive feedback loop affecting leverage is triggered by the variation in the value of
external securities holdings in interconnected balancesheets, as we will see.
The extend of the procyclical effects triggered by the fully-leverage banks’ behaviour will depend
on the capital structure of agents within the banking system and on the phase of the financial
cycle. In a high-leveraged financial system, both stronger shock amplification, and, therefore,
greater systemic risk are expected -during downturns and upturns-.
The expansion -or shrinking- of the balance sheets is not conducted through banks’ active
management of equity but through assets and liabilities, given our assumption of ”sticky” eq-
uity36.
In our model, own equity initially changes only via changes in external asset price in which
banks hold positions:
e¯i,t = ei,t−1 +
∑
k
nik,t−1 (pk,t − pk,t−1) (1.36)
and adjustments on the balance sheets are made via external securities, both on the assets
and liabilities sides:
di,t − di,t−1 ≡
∑
k
nik,t −
∑
k
nik,t−1 (1.37)
But given the overlapping nature of banks’ financial structures, own equity is also affected
by counterparties’ balancesheet variations, i.e., net wealth evolves according to the performance
of other banks’ trading.
The dynamics of the balance sheet management of fully-leveraged financial intermediaries
work as follows:
• In a scenario of increasing external asset prices, leverage falls. The resulting surplus ca-
pacity will lead to an expansion of the balance sheet, by taking on more external funding
-on the liabilities side- and searching for potential external investment opportunities -on
the assets side-. So both debt and credit will increase.
35Conversely, an upward price shock would induce asset purchases so banks adjust up the leverage and close
the gap.
36This assumption is in line with the results of Adrian and Shin (2011) showing that banks’ balance sheet
management reveals a relative ”stickiness” of equity, which behaves as the pre-determined variable, even during
upturns. This is captures also by the fact that leverage and asset growth are positively related.
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• Under falling external asset prices, banks face equity deficit and will adjust down their
increased leverage by shrinking their balance sheet: they will sell part of their external
assets and pay down a portion of their external debt.
In order to reduce exogenous constraints, we assume that banks do not face funding restric-
tions in real economy, i.e. there are always willing depositors; and that sovereigns face funding
necessity so the offer covers the demand of sovereign bonds.
1.5.1.1 BSM Accounting Rules.
The identification of shocks in sovereign debt prices as the triggering event for the amplification
mechanisms motivates the analysis of the decisions financial institutions make about their hold-
ings on sovereign debt.
As said previously, the connections among financial institutions and governments are based
on the decision banks make about their holdings of sovereign debt. This decision process could be
expressed through an accounting rule that would govern the balance sheet management process,
capturing the rate of change for asset k for bank i (the derivation is provided in Appendix D):
nik,t − nik,t−1
nik,t−1
= − i,t
αi,t−1
(λi,t−1 − λTi )
λi,t−1
=
i,t
αi,t−1λi,t−1
(λTi − λi,t−1) (1.38)
where αi,t is the ratio of external assets value to total assets value at time t-1.
Therefore, a fully-leveraged bank’s demand on external assets at time t will be given by:
nik,t = nik,t−1
[
1 +
i,t
αi,t−1λi,t−1
(λTi − λi,t−1)
]
(1.39)
Then, from the assumption of ”sticky” equity:
di,t − di,t−1
di,t−1
=
i,t
βi,t−1(λi,t−1 − 1)(λ
T
i − λi,t−1) (1.40)
where βi,t is the ratio of the value of external debt to the value of total debt for bank i at
time t.
Given the previous expression, we have:
di,t = di,t−1
[
1 +
i,t
βi,t−1(λi,t−1 − 1)(λ
T
i − λi,t−1)
]
(1.41)
It’s worth mentioning that the demand for external assets is a function directed related to
the deviation from the leverage target and inversely to the ratio of external assets to total assets,
while the demand for funds is inversely related to to the ratio of external debt to total debt37.
37This could be indicative of a kind of ”saturation”.
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1.5.2 The model.
In this section we develop a model that gives some insights into leverage dynamics within an
overlap financial network.
Our goal is to simulate the effects of marked-to-market overlapping portfolios in the dynamics
of leverage and assess how the stability of the financial system, that we have previously quali-
tatively analysed, depends on the degree of diversification, integration and indebtedness within
the network.
The simulation model is based on the idea that linkages among financial institutions can be
modelled through dependency matrices, following Elliot et al. (2014). The main concept behind
our leverage-dynamics analysis is that the value of a financial organization ultimately depends
on own and counterparties’ external assets.
The modelling aggregates the effects of linkages among banks on their financial situation,
leverage, into a linear dependence of each bank on others. In the literature, we find differ-
ent linkages patterns. Elliot, Golub and Jackson (2014), in line with Brioschi, Buzzacchi and
Colombo (1989) and Fedenia, Hodder and Triantis (1994), consider linkages among the assets of
different firms, for instance. We improve this framework accounting for cross-holdings by looking
at the presence of linkages among both assets and liabilities, arising from mutual lending and
borrowing relationships.
In order to capture these linkages, we assume that the value of bank i’s assets is ultimately
related to the value of the assets of bank j, for j 6= i.
The actual value of bank i’s assets depends on its counterparties’ capacity of meeting their
obligations, that is, on the value of assets of its obligors, which depends in turn on the strength
of obligors’ counterparties’ balance sheets. This creates an interdependency among the value of
assets of all banks in the network, namely, among banks’ financial robustness, which is consistent
with the reasoning followed so far: bank i’s leverage depends ultimately on counterparties’
leverage.
Financial linkages are modelled as linear dependences, as we will see.
1.5.2.1 Cross-holdings definition and bank’s value.
Previous specification of leverage is slightly modified in order to work with matrix notation.
There are N banks connected through a network of cross-holdings, via debt contracts. Ac-
cording to what expounded above, banks’ values depend ultimately on the market value of their
holdings of external assets: shocks hitting counterparties’ balance sheets affect own leverage
through interbank marked-to-marked exposures. There are K external assets, and the market
price (present value) of each external asset, pk,t, is subject to shocks. S denote a nonnegative,
column-stochastic matrix with generic entry si,k ≥ 0, that represents the share of the value of
external asset k held by bank i. It holds that
∑
i si,k = 1.
Recalling previous notation, we have that nik,t = sik,tnk
38, being nk the total supply of
external asset k. Therefore, nik,tpk,t denotes the value of external asset k held by i at time t. A
bank is shocked whenever
nik,tpk,t − nik,tpk,t−1 6= 0
being the size of the shock given by ∆pt = pk,t − pk,t−1.
38We consider a fixed total supply of external asset k, nk, normalized to one.
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Let q denote the column matrix whose k entry is equal to the Hadamard product of price
and supply vectors p and n, respectively: p ◦ n = (nkpk).
Interbank cross-holdings are captured by matrix W. W is still a column-stochastic weight
matrix, where wi,j ≥ 0 is defined now as the fraction of bank j’s value held by bank i, being
wi,i = 0 for all i.
There is also a fraction of a bank’s value held by agents in the external network. Diverse
market conditions affecting leverage dynamics are incorporated to our linear model by consider-
ing a range of leverage and capitalization levels. These are captured through different definitions
of the external network structure regarding liabilities.
Matrix Wˆ captures the linkages between banks and outside investors. The off-diagonal en-
tries of this matrix are defined to be 0, representing wˆi,i = 1 −
∑
j wji the fraction of bank i’s
value owned by an external investor.
When differentiating between external creditors and shareholders, the definition of matrix Wˆ
changes: wˆi,i 6= 1 −
∑
j wji, but wˆi,i ≥ 0, while there remains a fraction of bank i’s value held
by shareholders. These latter weights are given by the matrix W˜ , where w˜i,i = 1−
∑
j wj,i−wˆi,i.
We define the book value Vi of a bank i as the total value of the liability side of its balance
sheet -liabilities and capital-. This is equal to the value of bank i’s external assets plus the value
of its claims on other banks.
Vi,t =
∑
j
ωijVj,t +
∑
k
nik,tpk,t (1.42)
For our purposes, we will consider that the ultimate dependency of each bank on others is
instrumented through external assets. Therefore, equation 1.42 can be written in matrix notation
as V = WV + Sq. Solving for V we have:
V = (I−W)−1Sq (1.43)
Equation 1.43 shows that a bank’s value, and consequently, given the accounting identity,
the value of its assets, can be expressed in terms of the value of external assets, not only own
ones but also counterparties’. The value of external assets held directly by bank i affects bank
i’s value and also the books of the banks that hold a fraction of bank i’s value.
This interdependence among organizations is captured through the dependency matrix
D = (I−W)−1 (1.44)
, which accounts for cross-holdings39.
We define the market value of a bank in two ways, according to previous differentiation
regarding external liabilities:
1. The following equation is derived to represent bank’s equity value, vi,t = wˆiiVi,t, under-
stood as the value held by outside investors:
vi,t =
∑
j
ωijVj,t +
∑
k
nik,tpk,t −
∑
j
ωjiVi,t (1.45)
39The value of external assets held by bank i contributes directly to i’s equity value, but also counted partially
on the books of creditors within the interbank network holding a share of bank i’s value (Elliot, Golub and Jackson,
2014). These cross-holdings lead to a double-counting of external assets and, therefore, to an overstatement of a
bank’s value (French and Poterba, 1991), as is reflected by the fact that D is not column-stochastic.
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or in matrix notation, after substituting for the book value from 1.43:
v = WˆV = Wˆ(I−W)−1Sq (1.46)
In this case, the matrix capturing the dependency of equity value on own and others’
external asset holdings is defined
Dˆ = Wˆ(I−W)−1 (1.47)
2. If equity value is defined as the value of shareholders’ holdings, the market value of equity,
vi,t = w˜iiVi,t can be expressed as the current value of assets net of overall liabilities:
vi,t = ei,t =
∑
j
ωijVj,t +
∑
k
nik,tpk,t −
∑
j
ωjiVi,t − wˆiiVi,t (1.48)
Equation 1.48 can be written in matrix notation. After substituting for V from 1.43, it
becomes
v = W˜V = W˜(I−W)−1Sq (1.49)
Any shock in external asset value is transmitted to a bank’s equity value through the
matrix of interconnections, given in this case by matrix
D˜ = W˜(I−W)−1 (1.50)
Equations 1.46 and 1.49 show that a bank’s market value of equity can be represented as a
weighted sum of the values of own and others’ external asset holdings40.
The dependency matrix captures indirect and direct holdings. Let assume that each bank is
endowed with the 100% of one external asset k, so that N = K and S = I. Hence, the (ij)th
entry of matrix D -analogously, Dˆ or D˜, depending on the structure of the external network
considered- describes the dependency of bank i’s value on the value of bank j’s external asset
holdings.
The balance sheet of a bank at time t is now represented as follows:
Case 1
Assets Liabilities∑
j
ωijVj,t
∑
j
ωjiVi,t
∑
k
nik,tpk,t vit = wˆiiVi,t
Case 2
Assets Liabilities∑
j
ωijVj,t
∑
j
ωjiVi,t∑
k
nik,tpk,t wˆiiVi,t
eit = w˜iiVi,t
40Furthermore, when calculating the aggregate equity value of the financial system, interbank claims and
obligations cancel out. In the aggregation, the marked-to-market value of the net (external) assets -external
assets net of external liabilities- remains as the equity value of the financial system as a whole (Shin, 2008).
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1.5.2.2 Shock transmission: contagion.
The overlap structure of the financial system enables contagion, as the shock affecting one bank
constitutes a shock itself for the banks with whom the bank is linked through the interbank
exposures captured by the dependency matrix. Furthermore, a domino effect materialises given
that counterparties’ adjustments in response to the shock affect subsequently assets values, which
constitutes an additional negative shock.
The presence of financial interconnections, as described previously, implies that all banks are
affected by any shock hitting the value of external asset holdings of any one within the interbank
network. We track how negative shocks impacting on external asset value propagate through the
network of financial cross-holdings and how the balance sheet-management mechanism induces
further value disruptions affecting financial conditions -leverage-.
Even small and bank-specific shocks can be noticeably amplified. As the simulation results
show, not only the magnitude of the shock affects the occurrence of events such as selloffs or
defaults and the capacity of the system to converge to an equilibrium -the target leverage-, but
also market conditions.
In our model, selloffs occurred when the disposal of external assets after a balance sheet
adjustment leads to a decline in the value of the security so that nik,tpk,t ≤ 0.
The solvency of a bank is established with reference to a bank’s market value: if the value of
bank i’s assets is equal or lower than the value of i’s liabilities, the bank defaults, i.e., a default
occurs whenever vi,t ≤ 0.
The market conditions are captured by some network properties and node-specific charac-
teristics. The connectivity and integration of the network, bank balance sheet and, therefore,
financial robustness defined through the leverage ratio, are critical for financial stability.
Integration measure is given by the fraction of a financial institution’s value -liabilities- held
by other financials institutions and it captures the depth of borrowing-lending linkages. A more
integrated banking system is characterised by lower holdings of outside investors in each bank
within the network and, consequently, higher total cross-holdings of counterparties in each or-
ganization. Accordingly, w =
∑
j wij∀j 6= i is higher in more integrated systems, which is
equivalent to say that wˆii is lower.
As for financial interconnectedness, it captures the spread of interbank cross-holdings. The
level of diversification of the financial system is given by d = di =
∑
j gij , the average degree,
i.e., the expected number of interbank counterparties bank i lends to and the expected number
of other financial institutions bank i borrows from41.
Regarding financial robustness, various scenarios are recreated by defining different struc-
tures of the balance sheet’s liability side, as discussed previously.
Spillover effects and steady systemic instability are expected to be more significant in highly
leveraged and more integrated financials systems.
41When the graph representing the banking network is regular, indegree and outdegree of each node is equal
to each other, so that d¯i = di = di.
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1.5.2.3 Simulation on random networks.
In this section, we show that previous analytic results regarding leverage dynamics hold.
As this paper focuses on convergence and divergence leverage dynamics and explores how
financial institutions’ balance sheet management and interlinkages influence these dynamics, the
tracked outcome variable is the actual level of leverage resulting from variations of external-asset
value on account of shocks or balance-sheet adjustment processes.
We design the simulation framework with respect to:
1. The capital structure, regarding:
• Node characteristics: level of target leverage. We allow for different levels of capital-
ization. We vary the level of initial leverage, λi,0 = λi
T , by changing the definition of
a bank’s equity value. We consider the following cases:
(a) vi,t = wˆiiVi,t ≡ v=DˆSq. Equity is defined as bank’s assets net of interbank
liabilities - outside-investors equity -.
(b) vi,t = ei,t = w˜ii ≡ v=D˜Sq. Equity is defined as bank’s assets net of overall
liabilities - shareholders’ equity -.
(c) vi,t = Vi,t/λ
T
i ≡ v = V/λT. Equity is derived from the leverage ratio - assets-to-
target leverage ratio -.
In approaches (a) and (b), the initial level of leverage -target leverage- is endogenously
derived, while in (c) is defined exogenously. When defining a bank’s equity value as
in (a) and (b), the target leverage is expressed as the asset-to-equity ratio, having
been both assets and equity previously defined in terms of dependency on external
assets values, according to expressions 1.43, and 1.46 or 1.49, respectively. In the
remaining case, the target leverage is firstly set and the value of assets is obtained
from expression 1.43, being equity determined afterwards.
• Network properties: the range of w -wˆ and w˜- and d. We consider different funding
policies based on the weight of external funds versus funds raised form the interbank
market on the liabilities side. Each bank is equally exposed to other banks in the
banking system, holding that
∑
j wji =
∑
i wij∀i. The level of integration varies in
fixed increments with values w ∈ [0, 1].
Regarding the level of diversification, it holds that 0 ≤ d ≤ n− 1, being d randomly
chosen.
As a result, our simulation consists of multiples capital structures where we consider low,
medium and high levels of capitalization and interconnectedness.
2. The magnitude of the price shock. The exogenous shock is assumed to be asset-specific.
It is also a single shock, in the sense of hitting external assets only once at the beginning
of the simulation. We pick bank i and drop the value of the external asset held by it.
In order to assess the effect of the shock size on leverage dynamics, we consider different
shock intensities.
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1.5.2.3.1 Simulation framework.
In our model simulation, we consider the case of two banks42 presenting accounting symmetry
with the exception of external asset holdings. Each bank fully owns one external asset, so that
K = 2, being the dependency matrix equal to the identity matrix.
Consequently, we restrict our analysis to a regular and complete network, where wij = wji = w.
Accordingly, the dependency matrix is symmetric and without loss of generality the bank hit by
the shock is chosen randomly.
In a banking system consisting of two banks, i = 1, 2, and, therefore, two external assets,
k=1,2, we have that:
Sq =
(
sii,t 0
0 sjj,t
)(
nkipki,t
nkjpkj ,t
)(
s11,t 0
0 s22,t
)(
q1,t
q2,t
)
=
(
s11,tq1,t
s22,tq2,t
)
(1.51)
For the sake of simplicity, we additionally assume that external assets -government bonds-
are initially priced at par: pk,0 = 1 ≡ 100%. Therefore, each bank holds a single external asset
with value 1 and the expression in matrix notation Sq is equivalent to a k x 1 column vector
with all k elements equal to one, z. Hence, at t=0, previous expression becomes:
Sq =
(
s11,0 0
0 s22,0
)(
q1,0
q2,0
)
=
(
1
1
)
= z (1.52)
Two main scenarios are considered regarding the intensity of shocks affecting the diverse
capital structures, as we select the external asset held by bank 1 and make its value drops either
1% or 10%.
The conclusions change depending on whether we consider short or long-term dynamics. We
allow for this time-horizon effect by setting the number of periods of each realization T = 10 or
T = 50.
In order to analyse how integration, connectivity and initial levels of capitalization affect the
leverage dynamics triggered by external asset price shocks, we perform simulations on random
networks following an approach similar to the one used in Elliot et al. (2014). We combine those
network measures to determine the magnitude of impact of network effects on contagion and
shock amplification. Working with a random graph allows for comparative statics by imposing
some structure on cross-holdings distribution.
In a ER random graph model, the expected degree is computed as d = p(n− 1), where p is the
probability of two nodes being connected.
The interbank cross-holdings matrix W is derived from the graph (N, g), whose off-diagonal
entries are w, the fraction of each bank held by the other bank in the financial system.
Different funding scenarios are captured through w. In the simulation, we loop over the values
of integration parameter w within the range [0.1,0.7], varying in increments of 0.1.
Regarding external liabilities cross-holdings, if vi,t = wˆiiVi,t, the remaining fraction of each
bank is held by outside investors, so that the diagonal elements of matrix Wˆ are defined wˆ = 1−w.
However, if vi,t = ei,t = w˜iiVi,t, the outstanding bank’s value is distributed among sharehold-
ers, w˜, and external creditors, wˆ. In this context, wˆ is defined as a vector of the same length as w,
with the order of its elements reversed. As for shareholders’ equity, it is defined as w˜ = 1−w−wˆ.
42Obviously, a banking network of two banks imposed automatically a complete network design. We diminish
the relevance of this restriction for our simulation purposes for two reasons: firstly, considering a banking system
consisting of just two banks already allows for establishing the existence of unstable leverage dynamics, and
secondly, some part of the literature shows that the role of diversification can be ambiguous.
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The simulation is structured as follows43:
1. After defining some of the variables and parameters as explained above, a random graph
G with N=2 nodes and randomly-set degree d ≤ N is generated. We construct a 2-by-2
column-stochastic matrix of iid uniform random variables, with directed link-formation
probability of p = d/(n− 1) = d. The diagonal entries are set to zero to avoid self-links.
2. The matrix of cross-holdings is calculated from the directed random network: W=wG.
The remaining matrices are defined as Wˆ = wˆI and W˜ = w˜I, when applicable.
3. Dependency matrices are generated according to expressions 1.44 and either 1.47 or 1.50,
depending on the selected funding scenario.
In this case of two banks, i = 1, 2, and two external assets, k=1,2, the generic form of
dependency matrices is follows:
D =
(
dii dij
dji djj
)
=
(
d11 d12
d21 d22
)
(1.53)
4. Value initialization (t = 0). Initial values for assets, Vi,0, are calculated using expression
1.43, while initial equity values, vi,0, are determined as stated in equations 1.46 and 1.49.
Once these values are obtained, we proceed to assess the initial value of leverage, defined
as the assets-to-equity ratio, and, therefore, of target leverage, given our assumption λi,0 =
λTi .
Only in scenario (c), when the target leverage is exogenously set, the sequence followed
in the last step is reversed. In this case, we firstly set the level of target leverage and
determine the value of assets following 1.43, to subsequently derive the value of equity.
5. Initial price shock (t = 1). We drop the value pk of the external asset held by randomly-
chosen bank i and update matrix Sq. After hitting the system with this shock in prices,
the new values of assets, V¯i,1, equity, v¯i,1, and, therefore, the actual leverage, λ¯i,1, are
recalculated.
6. Adjustment process: (t = 1 + τ/τ := [1, T ]). The price shock implies a deviation from
equilibrium by deviating λi,t from λ
T
i . Considering the dependency analysis, and according
to expression 1.51 and 1.53, the new lambda after the shock hitting bank 1 is defined44:
λ¯1,t =
(d11s11,t−1q1,t) + (d12s22,t−1q2,t−1)
e¯1,t
(1.54)
Whenever the leverage gap materializes, i.e., λi,t 6= λTi , an adjustment process begins.
When confronting negative price shocks, banks adjust down leverage by selling assets worth
x, and paying down x worth of debt. Variable xi,t quantifies the adjustment undertaken
by shocked bank i at time t and is defined as the variation in the value of external asset
holdings. In our specific case of N=2:
x1,t = s11,tq1,t − s11,t−1q1,t = λ
T
1 e¯1,t − d11(s11,t−1q1,t)− d12(s22,t−1q2,t−1)
d11
(1.55)
such that, theoretically:
λT1 =
[d11(s11,t−1q1,t + x1)] + (d12s22,t−1q2,t−1)
e¯1,t
(1.56)
43The simulation design is implemented so it can be easily extrapolated to a N-banks case.
44As anticipated, equity initially changes only via changes in external asset price in which banks hold positions:
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As shown in expression 1.42, bank i’s counterparties are indirectly affected by shocks hitting
i, being the new level of bank 2’s leverage given by:
λ¯2,t =
(d22s22,t−1q2,t−1) + (d21s11,t−1q1,t)
e¯2,t
(1.57)
Consequently, there is a simultaneous adjustment performed by financial organizations
exposed to i. In the network under consideration, this adjustment is equivalent to:
x2,t = s22,tq2,t−1 − s22,t−1q2,t−1 = λ
T
2 e¯2,t − d22(s22,t−1q2,t−1)− d21(s11,t−1q1,t)
d22
(1.58)
so the following expression hypothetically holds
λT2 =
[d22(s22,t−1q2,t−1 + x2)] + (d21s11,t−1q1,t)
e¯2,t
(1.59)
We assume absence of rational expectations in our model, i.e., short-sighted banks are not
able to anticipate counterparties’ adapting behaviour, and so expressions 1.56 and 1.59 do
not actually hold. For these expressions to hold, the categorical value of external assets
held by the counterparty to be incorporated in adjustments 1.55 and 1.58 and, therefore,
in previous expressions should be given by s22,tq2,t−1 instead of by s22,t−1q2,t−1, and by
s11,tq1,t instead of by s11,t−1q1,t, respectively.
By not being capable to foresee the effect of other banks’ adjustments on own assets and
equity, banks do not incorporate true expectations in own behaviour.
With regard to equity, an analog process emerges. As balance-sheet adjustments are made
via external securities, both on the assets and liabilities sides, own equity should remain
unchanged during the adjustment process, ei,t = e¯i,t. On the contrary, changes in the value
of assets due to a bank’s own balance sheet management induce further variations in the
value of equity of connected banks. Consequently, equity indeed varies in counterparties’
balance sheets without banks anticipating this effect.
This deviation in equity can be expressed as follows:
ei,t − e¯i,t = dii[sjj,tqj,t−1 − sjj,t−1qj,t−1] = dijxj,t (1.60)
Therefore, the intensity of the adjustment will be erroneous and the leverage gap will not
be closed by the end of the period. Iterated processes of adjustments will then trigger and
perpetuate until either both banks achieve their objective of reaching the target leverage
level, at least one default or one asset selloff occurs.
The adjustment in this context would be expressed as follows:
xi,t+1 =
λTi e¯i,t+1 − dii(sii,tqi,t)− dij(sjj,tqj,t)
dii
(1.61)
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Figure 1.12 represents the market dynamics triggered by fully-leveraged banks’ balance sheet
management, given an exogenous shock in sovereign debt prices, and the amplification mecha-
nism:
Figure 1.12: Flow-chart of the leverage-asset holdings cycle.
1.5.2.3.2 Simulation results.
Three main scenarios are simulated, based on different levels of target leverage. For each of
these frameworks, we vary the level of integration while holding the level of diversification fixed,
in order to assess how the stability of the system behaves according to the degree of interbank
connectedness.
Holding the network degree fixed, increasing w increases integration but not connectivity. As
w increases, so does the fraction of bank i’s cross-holdings in other banks it has already estab-
lished financial linkages with. Therefore, the (ij)th entry of the dependency matrices described
previously in 1.44, 1.47 and 1.50 is increasing in w.
The same leverage-asset holding cycle is evidenced in each scenario and for every loop over
ω. It can be summarized as follows:
• At t = 0, leverage λi,0 is set equal to the target leverage, λTi . This level is the same for all
banks, but not common knowledge -in order to enable forecasting deficiencies-.
• At t = 1, a price shock materializes, involving direct and indirect effects on leverage. It
induces an immediate variation on leverage of the bank directly exposed to the shocked
asset, as well as a further deviation as the value of its internal assets -counterparties’
obligations - is affected by the indirect exposure of the obligor to external asset shocks.
This exposure is captured in our model through the dependency matrix in 1.44. Thus,
the shock affects all organizations within the interbank network, through either direct or
indirect channels, and initially deviates leverage out of the equilibrium, from λTi to λi,1.
• Banks manage their balance sheets actively to as to maintain their leverage ratio at the
target level. At t = 2, this re-sizing of banks’ balance sheet is implemented through an
adjustment in external asset holdings and external funds according to the accounting rule
in 1.37 and expressions 1.55 and 1.58, respectively. This latter adjustment has a subsequent
impact on the value of external assets, and consequently a further effect on leverage. As
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banks are not capable to anticipate and incorporate into their adjustment routine the effect
of counterparties’ behaviour, by the end of the period leverage is expected to not return to
”equilibrium” levels. This latter condition concludes a whole the leverage-asset holdings
cycle, and cause the beginning of a new one.
• At t = 3 a new cycle is indeed set in motion. Henceforth, banks perform iterative adjust-
ments as stated in 1.37 and 1.61, ceasing the process only once leverage returns to the
equilibrium level or either a default or selloff occurs.
We find that convergence dynamics of leverage45 depend on the interaction between some
characteristics of a bank’s capital structure -integration and capitalization- and between these
properties and the level of the price shock. Depending on different contexts arising from diverse
interplays, leverage dynamics evolves as follows:
Result 1: High level of capitalization. Equity is defined as bank’s assets net of inter-
bank liabilities. Making no distinction between external liabilities and shareholders equity
implies an overestimated capitalization and, therefore, an underestimated leverage.
Figure 1.13 illustrates leverage dynamics as the level of integration varies, remaining the
level of diversification fixed.
The extent of the effects of a price shock on leverage dynamics increases in network in-
tegration. The depth of interbank cross-holdings affects the leverage-gap amplitude and,
consequently, the intensity of the required adjustment. The higher w, the deeper the fi-
nancial interdependencies and the stronger the scope of the shock within the interbank
market. As we continue to increase integration, the collateral effects through the exposure
to the shocked bank intensify and the proportional relation between adjustment decreases,
as the affected counterparty becomes more vulnerable to shocks and is forced to strengthen
the adjustment.
We can distinguish different dynamics patterns regarding the convergence behaviour.
– When the system converges simultaneously, asymptotically or not, to the leverage
target, a bank’s leverage gap resulting from the non-anticipated effects of the coun-
terparty’s balance sheet management decreases over time, and so do the required
adjustment. This holds for levels of w ∈ [0.1, 0.4] as shown in figure 1.13.
– The system can also manifest an overall but non-simultaneous convergent behaviour,
i.e., the system globally converges to the leverage target but individual leverage levels
do not converge simultaneously to the target. Periods of individual convergence may
alternate with periods of divergence. Convergence occurs when the magnitude of the
effect of the own adjustment is greater than the magnitude of the effects of the coun-
terparty’s adjustment: diixi,t > dijxj,t. Alternatively, there is divergence whenever
the effect of own adjustment is equal to the effect of others’, diixi,t = dijxj,t, so own
leverage is boosted to levels even higher than in previous period: λit > λi,t−1 > λT ,
but not higher than those ones in t − 2, so the convergence to be possible. This
happens for w ∈ [0.5, 0.6] in panel (a) of figure 1.13 and for w = 0.5 in panel (b).
– On the contrary, the system can also show an overall non-simultaneous divergent
pattern. Periods of individual convergence alternate with periods of divergence, but
45Systemic convergency is achieved when all agents within the interbank network manage to close their leverage
gaps. We assume this leverage gap to be significant whenever it holds λi,t − λT < 1 ∗ 10−3. By changing the
decimal-digits precision, the results of our simulation can vary.
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this time the strength of own adjustment is not great enough to push leverage down
to a level lower than the one reached in t − 2 during periods of convergence, and
the effects of the counterparty adjustments boost leverage to the highest level so far
during periods of divergence. This is the case for w = 0.6 in panel (b) of figure 1.13.
– Lastly, when the system diverges simultaneously, we observe that a bank’s leverage
gap increases over time and so do the intensity of its balance sheet management.
Agents within the interbank network become more susceptible to the behaviour of
the counterparty due to higher financial integration, w = 0.7.
Additionally, the consequences of integration are influenced by the level of the price shock:
– Shock: 1%. For low levels of interbank exposure (0.1 ≤ w ≤ 0.3), the system ab-
sorbs immediately the price shock after a one-period adjustment. Then, the number
of periods required to reach the target value increases as the interbank market be-
comes more integrated. For higher values of w, the dynamics of the system change.
Specifically, for w = 0.6, the system asymptotically converges to the target value,
whilst it diverges for higher levels of integration and both banks defaults in the short
term.
– Shock: 10%. Similarly to what happens in the presence of a small shock, for low
levels of integration, w ∈ [0.1, 0.5], the system manage to absorb the shock and turn
to the equilibrium. Nevertheless, the convergence to equilibrium will be more gradual
and extended over time. As interbank cross-holdings become deeper, the capacity of
the system to return to pre-shock leverage levels severely decreases. This inability
leads to divergent dynamics that result in defaults and selloffs for the highest levels
of interbank exposure.
(a) Low-level price shock (b) High-level price shock
Figure 1.13: Integration effects on leverage dynamics -high level of capitalization-
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Result 2: Medium level of capitalization. Equity is now defined as bank’s assets net
of overall liabilities. Consequently, leverage is not underestimated; still we work with levels
of leverage lower than the maximum suggested or imposed by regulators.
Figure 1.14 illustrates how integration affects leverage dynamics in this new context of
lower capitalization. It follows that the vulnerability of the system not only depends on
the degree of financial integration but also on the initial financial robustness of banks.
As previously, we can observe diverse patterns of convergence dynamics influenced by the
size of the shock and the depth of interconnectivity.
– Shock: 1%. In the case of a more leveraged system, only when w is sufficiently low,
w = 0.1, the system absorbs the price shock and converges to the target leverage,
but not simultaneously. The number of periods required to reach the target value is
higher than in previous scenario, though. When the level of integration is still low,
w = 2, the system converges asymptotically to the equilibrium level. For values of
integration within the range w := {0.3, ..., 0.7}, leverage dynamics diverge from the
target and both defaults and selloffs occur even in the short term. As w increases,
the number of periods to any of these events decreases.
– Shock: 10%. Similarly to what happens in the presence of a small shock, for the
lowest level of integration the system manage to absorb the shock and turn to the
equilibrium, but this process extends over a longer period of time due to the magni-
tude of the shock. When w is still low, w = 0.2, the system manifests a divergent
non-simultaneous behaviour that results in rapid selloffs. For any other value of
w ∈ [0.2, 0.7], the system is not able to assimilate the shock and default events and
selloffs materialize in the very short term. Furthermore, the initial shock triggers an
immediate default when integration has reached its maximum.
(a) Low-level price shock (b) High-level price shock
Figure 1.14: Integration effects on leverage dynamics -medium level of capitalization-
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Result 3: Low level of capitalization. The level of leverage is imposed exogenously
and equity is then derived from the leverage ratio - assets-to- target leverage ratio -. By
doing so, we set a more realistic leverage value that results in a lessened financial robustness.
Figure 1.15 shows how the effects of a price shock vary with w in a context of low initial
capitalization. The resistance of the system to shocks decreases with integration, so higher
levels of w correspond to earlier defaults.
Figure 1.15: Integration effects on leverage dynamics -low-level capitalization and price shock-
In the presence of an small shock, leverage can be returned to its equilibrium value only
when integration is at its minimum level, but this takes considerably longer than in previous
simulation scenarios. For w ∈ [0.2, 0.7], there is no convergence to the target and the
system defaults in the short term. The promptness with which the equity of an organisation
falls below zero increases with integration.
When a high-level price shock occurs, the system does not manage to absorb it. Either
the value of the external asset held by the shocked bank falls below zero as a consequence
of asset selloffs or both institutions default during the first period of adjustment.
In any case, whatever the convergence pattern, the system exhibits synchronized dynamics
given by banks’ active balance sheet management.
The absence of expectations about others’ performance lead to overadjustments that result in
persistent deviations from the leverage target. Only if this gap decreases over time, there is
convergence to the equilibrium.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the others’ adjustments on assets affects the size of own’s leverage
gap at the end of each period. The greater the counterparty’s adjustment, the greater own
leverage deviation from the target due to interdependence effects. Hence, the bank will be
forced to adjust more the next period.
Panels of figure 1.16 shows how banks adjust more than the other periodically. Even if the
proportional relation between adjustment decreases in w, it remains constant over alternate it-
eration periods for a fixed integration degree, i.e., xi,t+1/xj,t+1 = xj,t/xi,t = x.
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(a) High capitalization (b) Medium capitalization
(c) Low capitalization
Figure 1.16: Synchronization of leverage dynamics
As initial capitalization deteriorates, the difference between banks’ adjustments increases,
and so does the difference between the respective leverage levels over time. The magnitude of
the adjustments is also increasing in capitalisation deterioration.
It can be observed that whenever the system exhibits divergence, we observe that a banks’
adjustments in t is greater than the one in t− 2. The opposite holds for convergence.
To summarise, our simulation results proof that unstable leverages dynamics arise when
considering marked-to-market leverage and under the assumption of banks’ incapacity to form
correct expectations on the performance of their counterparties within the interbank network.
Instability manifests through the inability of systemic leverage to converge to the equilibrium
level: the target leverage. We have shown that convergence is affected by some network properties
and node-specific characteristics.
More specifically, the conclusion derived from the analysis of leverage dynamics is that increasing
integration reduces the resilience of the system to shocks affecting external asset price in the
specific case of two banks. The vulnerability of the system depends subsequently on the financial
robustness of the banks it comprises and on the size of the shock that distresses it. Therefore,
the effects of integration are magnified as financial robustness deteriorates and the magnitude
of the shock increases.
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1.6 Conclusions.
In analyzing the interactions and feedback relationships within the financial network, we have
followed an analytical and quantitative approach to overlap and contagion.
One of the novelties of our work if that we have provided explicit analytical foundation to
leverage dynamics and the functioning of the overlap financial structure. In doing so, we have
considered diverse leverage valuation methodologies, namely the ones adopted in finance theory
and empirical finance. The conclusions derived have then been tested by simulating leverage
dynamics within a heterogeneous financial network.
We have firstly shown how the chosen analytical method affects significantly the results of the
equilibrium analysis, i.e., different valuations of leverage lead to different potential equilibriums.
Additionally, we have evidenced that the existence of an equilibrium is ultimately strongly af-
fected by the structure of balance sheets and, therefore, by the level of leverage of the system.
Within the banking network, banks reveal an individualistic behaviour as leverage-targeting
institutions. But homogenised dynamics may arise as banks adopt the same strategies. This
would be the case of fully-leveraged financial institutions reacting to an external event impacting
on their net worth. Affected banks actively manage their balance sheets -by adjusting the level
of external securities- to maintain leverage at the target level. This synchronised behaviour may
amplify, under certain circumstances, the effects of external shocks, even if they are small.
Our simulation results confirm the importance of leverage in the origination of endogenous
financial processes, ultimate leading to crises. Excessive leverage increases the vulnerability of
system to small fluctuations and may lead to systemic events.
The level of leverage determines the intensity of the balance sheet management process. This
intensity is crucial in determining further feedbacks effects affecting the value of of the holdings
of external assets.
We have analysed how the stability of the financial system is determined by the interaction
among bank, market and network attributes. Particularly, convergence dynamics of leverage
depends on capitalisation, diversification integration, the level of the price shock and the rate of
adjustment to the target leverage.
The dynamics of the model become unstable when introducing explicitly the dependency of
one bank’s leverage on their counterparties’ leverage.
The main concept behind our leverage-dynamics analysis is that the value of a financial organ-
isation ultimately depends on own and counterparties’ external assets. Consequently, we have
modelled the linkages among financial institutions through dependency matrices.
Different scenarios have been simulated, based on different levels of target leverage. For each of
these frameworks, we varied the level of integration while holding the level of diversification fixed,
in order to assess how the stability of the system behaves according to the degree of interbank
connectedness.
The developed agent-based model has made it possible to improve the analysis concerning
some ambiguous relationships among variables, even if the role of diversification may still be
ambiguous in the presence of amplification mechanisms. To this regard, some additional simu-
lations have been made for a financial system consisting of N banks, with N > 2.
When considering different levels of diversification, accounting also for incomplete networks, pat-
terns similar to the ones captured in the 2-bank case are observed. Nevertheless, this analysis
will be thoroughly covered in future research.
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Our simulation results proof that unstable leverages dynamics arise when considering marked-
to-market leverage and under the assumption of banks’ incapacity to form correct expectations
on the performance of their counterparties within the interbank network.
Additionally, some conclusions are drawn from our analysis regarding to the suitability of
imposing countercyclical macroprudential policies.
We have analytically illustrated that the amplification mechanism may drive leverage to an
”overshoot” equilibrium in the presence of an external asset bubble burst only if these kind of
policies are applied.
Common knowledge of a target leverage and, therefore, perfect-forecasting capacity of counter-
parties’ targets, allows for anticipation of others’ balance sheet adjustments and the incorporation
of these true expectations in own behaviour. Otherwise, as the leverage dynamics model simu-
lations proves, the existence of equilibrium can not be ensured.
In this sense, the imposition of counter-cyclical leverage requirements may be effective. Nev-
ertheless, the choice of leverage ratios by macroprudential authorities should be based on the
actual structure in order to ensure a systemic equilibrium.
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Appendix A
A Static Analysis of Interaction
in Overlapping Portfolios
A.1 Mark-to-market asset values, book value of liabilities:
Asymmetric case of two banks
A.1.1 Curvature of the leverage function
In the following we study the curvature of the leverage function. Being the expression for the
second derivative of bank i’s leverage with respect to the counterpart’s leverage:
∂2λi
∂λ2j
=
[
2ξ2bj(di+bi)
(R+ξλj)
3
] [
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
] [
bj
R+ξλj
−
(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
)]
[
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
]4
(A.1)
Some considerations have to be made about the sign of this derivative:
The denominator will always be positive, as the expression in brackets -which is the def-
inition of net worth- is to a even number power. Furthermore, by assumption, the equity/
net worth has to be greater than 0 (an equity equal or lower than 0 means bankruptcy),
so the derivative can not became infinite.
Regarding the numerator, we have to consider that, by assumption:
– The rate of return can not be negative, so R + ξλ−i > 0. So this expression to any
power will be positive.
– Always by assumption, the liabilities can not be negative, so (di + bi) > 0. Technically
a negative liability is an asset, and should be classified so.
– The equity/ net worth has to be greater than 0, as said previously.
That said, for the numerator -and, consequently, the previous derivative- to be positive, it
must hold:
bj
R+ ξλj
−
(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ ξλj
− (di + bi)
)
> 0 (A.2)
53
which could be, for instance, the case in which a bank does not have positions in external
assets/ liabilities, with interbank liabilities being greater than zero. Or it may happen that the
holdings of external assets are lower than total liabilities, so ni,kpk < di + bi.
On the other hand, for the numerator -and, consequently, the previous derivative- to be negative,
the opposite must hold.
When analysing the effects of the exposure to a counterparty on the slope of the leverage
curve:
∂
∂bj
(
∂λi
∂λj
)
=
ξ(di+bi)
(R+ξλj)
2
(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
) [(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
)
− 2bjR+ξλj
]
(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
)4
(A.3)
we have that the sign of this expression depends on whether
ni,kpk − b−i
R+ ξλ−i
> (di + bi) (A.4)
So the difference between the value of external and internal assets has to be grater than the
value of total liabilities in order to have ∂∂b−i
(
∂λi
∂λ−i
)
> 0.
Additionally, the sign of the following derivative:
∂
∂nk
(
∂λi
∂pk
)
=
− (di + bi)
(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
)2
+
[
2pkni,k(bi + di)
(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
)]
(
ni,kpk +
bj
R+ξλj
− (di + bi)
)4
(A.5)
depends on whether ni,kpk − bjR+ξλj > di + bi (to be positive) or not.
A.1.2 Equilibrium of the system: the intersection point in the plane.
We are interested in finding a point of equilibrium. So we will consider the two graphs consisting
on the expressions for λ1 and λ2 and calculate the intersection point(s) of both.
λ1 =
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ξλ2
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ξλ2
− (d1 + b1)
(A.6)
λ2 =
n2,kpk +
b1
R+ξλ1
n2,kpk +
b1
R+ξλ1
− (d2 + b2)
(A.7)
Solving expression A.7 for λ1:
λ1 = −R
ξ
+
b1(1− λ2)
ξ[(λ2 − 1)n2,kpk + λ2(d2 + b2)] (A.8)
and setting the previous equation for λ1 equal to expression A.6 and solving for λ2, we have
that the λ2-coordinate of the intersection point will be the solution for the quadratic equation:
λ22ξ[(P2 −N2)[ξP1 +R(P1 −N1)]− (P1 −N1)b1]
+λ2[(P2 −N2)(R[ξP1 +R(P1 −N1)− b2] + ξb2)− (P1 −N1)[Rb1 + ξP2] + b1b2 − ξ2P1P2]
+R(P1 −N1)(P2 +B1) +R(b2P2 + ξP1P2)− b1b2 − P1P2 = 0
(A.9)
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where Pi = ni,kpk and Ni = di + bi
By plugging the solution to the previous expression into A.7, we will get λ1-coordinate of the
intersection point.
A.2 Mark-to-market asset values and liabilities:
Asymmetric case of two banks: General resolution.
A.2.1 Linearisation of the system of non-linear equations: λ∗1 6= λ∗2
The system of non-linear equations is given by:
f (λ1, λ2) = [ξ (N1 − d1)− 1]λ21 + [N1 (R− ξ)− d1R]λ1 −N1R = 0 (A.10)
g (λ1, λ2) = [ξ (N2 − d2)− 1]λ22 + [N2 (R− ξ)− d2R]λ2 −N2R = 0 (A.11)
When linearising the expressions A.10 and A.11 using the Taylor expansion and solving for
λ1 and λ2, we get expressions of the form λ1 = F (λ
∗, pk) and λ2 = G(λ∗, pk):
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(A.12)
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(A.13)
A.2.2 Linearisation of the system of non-linear equations: λ∗1 = λ
∗
2.
When linearising around the point λ∗ = λ∗1 = λ
∗
2 we get:
f (λ1, λ2) ≈ − (λ∗)2
[
ξ
(
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ ξλ∗
)
− ξd1 − 1
]
+λ1
[
ξ
(
n1,kpk +
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)
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(A.14)
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(A.15)
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We solve the previous system by equaling both expressions. After some algebra, we get:
λ1 =
[
n1,k [ξ (2λ
∗ − 1) +Rpk]−d1 (ξ2λ∗ +R)−2λ∗+b2
[
1
R+ ξλ∗
(
R− ξ + ξR
R+ ξλ∗
)
+ ξλ∗
(
2− ξλ
∗ +R− ξ
R+ ξλ∗
)]
+
(b2 − b1)
(
ξλ∗ (ξλ∗ + (R− ξ))− ξR
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)]−1
[(
ξλ∗
[
λ∗
[
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]
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]
−R
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+λ2
(
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(
1
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[ξ (2λ∗ − 1) +R]
)
− (d1 − d2) (ξ2λ∗ +R)− d1 (ξ2λ∗ +R)− 2λ∗
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[
1
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(
ξ [2λ∗ − 1] +R− ξλ
∗ (ξλ∗ +R− ξ)− ξR
R+ ξλ∗
)])]
(A.16)
By plugging this expression into equation A.15, for instance, we can get an expression of the
form: λ2 = G(λ
∗), that we can plug into expression A.14 in order to get λ1 = F (λ∗).1
A.2.3 Some particular cases.
• Case: Identical exposure to external network, different interbank cross-holdings.
In this case we have:
n1,k = n2,k = nk; d1 = d2 = d.
and expression A.16 can be simplified as follows:
λ1 =[
n1,k [ξ (2λ
∗ − 1) +Rpk]−d (ξ2λ∗ +R)+2λ∗(ξb2−1)+ 1
R+ ξλ∗
[
b2(R− ξ)− b1 (ξλ
∗(ξλ∗ +R− ξ)− ξR)
R+ ξλ∗
]]−1
[
b2 − b1
R+ ξλ∗
(
ξλ∗
[
λ∗ +
R− λ∗(ξλ∗ +R− ξ)
R+ ξλ∗
]
−R
)
+ λ2
(
[Rsk − ξ (2λ∗ − 1)]nk − b2 − b1
R+ ξλ∗
[ξ (2λ∗ − 1) +R]− d (ξ2λ∗ +R)− 2λ∗
+ b2
[
1
R+ ξλ∗
(
ξ [2λ∗ − 1] +R− ξλ
∗ (ξλ∗ +R− ξ)− ξR
R+ ξλ∗
)])]
(A.17)
Then, as done previously, we could substitute λ1 with this expression in equation A.15, for
instance, and get an expression of the form: λ2 = G(λ
∗), that we can plug into expression
A.14 in order to get λ1 = F (λ
∗).2
1For the sake of simplicity, we are skipping this calculation.
Note that expression (A.69) is expressed in terms of differences of holdings among banks
2Once again, for the sake of simplicity, we are skipping this calculation.
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• Case: One debtor, one creditor within the interbank network
In this case we have:
b1 > 0; b2 = 0
and expression A.16 can be simplified as follows:
λ1 =
[
n1,k [ξ (2λ
∗ − 1) +Rpk]−d1 (ξ2λ∗ +R)−2λ∗−b1
(
ξλ∗ (ξλ∗ + (R− ξ))− ξR
(R+ ξλ∗)2
)]−1
[(
ξλ∗ (λ∗ [(d1 − d2)− (n2,k − n1,k) pk])+ b1
R+ ξλ∗
[
R− ξλ∗
(
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R− λ∗(ξλ∗ +R− ξ)
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)]
−R(n1,k−n2,k)pk
)
+ λ2
(
[Rpk − 1] [n2,k − n1,k] + [Rsk − ξ (2λ∗ − 1)]n1,k
+ b1
(
1
R+ ξλ∗
[ξ (2λ∗ − 1) +R]
)
− (d1 − d2) (ξ2λ∗ +R)− d1 (ξ2λ∗ +R)− 2λ∗
)]
(A.18)
Then, as done previously, we could substitute λ1 with this expression in equation A.15, for
instance, and get an expression of the form: λ2 = G(λ
∗), that we can plug into expression
A.14 in order to get λ1 = F (λ
∗).3
• Case: Identical exposure to external network; one debtor, one creditor within
the interbank network.
In this case we have:
n1,k = n2,k = nk; d1 = d2 = d; b1 > 0; b2 = 0
and expression A.16 can be simplified as follows:
λ1 =
[
n1,k [ξ (2λ
∗ − 1) +Rpk]−d (ξ2λ∗ +R)−2λ∗−b1
(
ξλ∗ (ξλ∗ + (R− ξ))− ξR
(R+ ξλ∗)2
)]−1
[
b1
R+ ξλ∗
(
R− ξλ∗
[
1 +
R− λ∗(ξλ∗ +R− ξ)
R+ ξλ∗
])
+ λ2
(
[Rsk − ξ (2λ∗ − 1)]nk + b1
(
1
R+ ξλ∗
[ξ (2λ∗ − 1) +R]
)
− d (ξ2λ∗ +R)− 2λ∗
)]
(A.19)
Then, as done previously, we could substitute previous expression in equation A.15, for
instance, and get an expression of the form: λ2 = G(λ
∗), that we can plug into expression
A.14 in order to get λ1 = F (λ
∗).4
3Once again, for the sake of simplicity, we are skipping this calculation.
4Once again, for the sake of simplicity, we are skipping this calculation.
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• Case: One strong bank, one stressed bank.
In this case we have heterogeneous ξ, in the sense that:
ξ1 = 0 Mkt. perception of financial robustness ; ξ2 > 0 Mkt. perception of financial weakness
In this case, the equations for leverage are:
λ1 =
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ξ2λ2
n1,kpk +
b2
R+ξ2λ2
− (d1 + b1R ) (A.20)
λ2 =
n2,kpk +
b1
R
n2,kpk +
b1
R −
(
d2 +
b2
R+ξ2λ2
) (A.21)
When solving equation A.21 for λ2, we get a quadratic expression which results independent
from λ1:
λ22
[
ξ2(n2,k +
b1
R
− d2)− 1
]
+ λ2
[
(n2,k +
b1
R
)(R− ξ2)− d2R
]
− (n2,k + b1
R
)R = 0
(A.22)
If we solve this quadratic expression, we can plug the resulting expression for λ2 into
equation A.20 and get the expression for λ1.
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Appendix B
Dynamics in the network.
An endogenous mechanism of links formation based on preferential attachment could be imple-
mented: each bank enters a financial (credit) contract with peers with a probability proportional
to potential neighbor’s financial robustness. A limit the notional value of interbank debts would
be set to . This won’t not prevent banks from changing counterparties, but just limit lending
capacities in the interbank market.
An agent’s fitness could be expressed as a function of her probability of default. Therefore,
an agent’s attractiveness will depend on her financial robustness.
Each agent will form a new link with an agent j -and cut an existing one with agent k- with
the following probability1:
Pi,t =
1
1 + ePj−Pk
(B.1)
or will keep its existing link with probability (1− Pi,t).
1This expresion for the probability of link formation is based on the one used in Lenzu and Tedeschi, 2011.
Although we are not including a parameter capturing the signal credibility about other peers’ financial conditions
information.
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Appendix C
An alternative approach to the
analysis of leverage.
In this section we set up an scenario where we can study the dependency on leverage of variables
derived from economic measures such as RoE or the market value of assets, symmetry assumed.
Rearranging expressions 3 and 11 , we have, respectively:
λ
[
pknk +
b
R+ ξλ
− (d+ b)
]
= pknk +
b
R+ ξλ
(C.1)
and
λ [pknk − d] = pknk + b
R+ ξλ
(C.2)
The left-hand side in both equations is equivalent to λ*Net Worth, while the right-hand side
is equivalent to the market value of assets.
Equations C.1 and C.2 capture the condition for the intersection of the curves n(λ) = λ*Net
Worth and m(λ) = market value of assets. Solving for λ we get the respective expressions for
the abscissa of the equilibrium points -λ-, that are equal to the ones given by expressions 5 and
13 , and so are the conclusions about the equilibrium.
When evaluating the efficiency of a firm, two are the most important measures to be consider:
Return on Equity (RoE) and Return on assets (RoA). The DuPont identity, a popular formula
for dividing ROE into its core components, explains the relationship between both measures
of management effectiveness as follows: RoE = RoA ∗ leverage. ROE can be related to ROA
by multiplying a factor of financial leverage. According to financial literature, gains in financial
leverage leads to higher RoE - even if financial leverage benefits diminish as the risk of defaulting
on interest payments increases -.
Expressions C.1 and C.2 result from substituting the expressions for RoE (RoE= Net Income/
Equity) and RoA (RoE= Net Income/ Assets) in the DuPont identity linking RoE and RoA. So
the LHS of the equation λ*Net Worth is equivalent to RoERoA ∗ equity, and it is nothing but a term
proportional to the RoE-to-RoA ratio.
The effects of changes in leverage on the function on the left-hand side of equation C.1 seemed
to be uncertain when calculating the partial derivative. But when looking at the asymptotic
behaviour of the function, it’s evident that the slope cannot be anything but positive. Regarding
expression C.2, the sign of the derivative is unambiguously positive. Analogously, the responses
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of the market value of assets to variations in leverage are of the same sign, regardless of the
valuation of interbank debt. The market value of assets is decreasing in leverage.
But when studying the concavity of both m(λ) and n(λ), we find that whilst the second derivative
of function m(λ) with respect to leverage has the same sign -positive- independently of the
methodology underlying the valuation of interbank debt, the second derivative of function n(λ)
with respect to leverage can be either negative or zero, depending on whether we consider the
book value or the market value of internal liabilities. So the representation of the curves in the
plane would be as shown in figure C.1.
(a) Book value of liabilities (b) Mkt value of liabilities
Figure C.1: λ*Net Worth and market value of assets curves
According to the statement previously mentioned in regard to the relationship between ROE
and leverage, a higher proportion of debt in the capital structure (and, therefore, a higher
leverage) leads to higher ROE. This is captured by the positive slope of curve RoERoA ∗ equity.
Nevertheless, taking on too much debt may cause the cost of debt increases as creditors could
demand a higher risk premium, and the benefits arising out of the gains in leverage would
decrease. The negativeness of the second derivative of curve RoERoA ∗equity with respect to leverage
captures this fact when considering the book value of interbank liabilities, whereas we miss this
evidence when valuing internal debt at market prices.
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Appendix D
Derivation of an accounting rule
based on leverage targeting.
Recalling the expression for leverage
λit =
∑
k
nik,tpk,t +
∑
j
ωij
bj,t
Rt+ξi,tλj,t(∑
k
nik,tpk,t +
∑
j
ωij
bj,t
R+ξi,tλj,t
)
− (di,t + bi,t)
(D.1)
Before deriving the accounting rule governing a bank’s balance sheet management, we recall
some of the assumptions made so far. At an aggregate level, notional value of interbank holdings
remain constant over time (bi,t = bi), so , given that equity remains ”sticky”, leverage is adjusted
through external positions.
Furthermore, we don’t address the effect of changes in counterparties’ leverage on this rule for
the moment (Bi,t =
bi,t
Rt+ξi,tλi,t
= Bi).
The balance sheet management process establishes a linkage between two adjacent periods
in time: in each period stocks generates flows updating the stocks.
At time t=0
λTi = λi,0 =
∑
k nik,0pk,0 +
∑
j wijBj∑
k nik,0pk,0 +
∑
j wijBj − (Bi + di,0)
(D.2)
We define bank i’s external assets as the sum of bank i’s claims against agents in the real
sector -private or public (sovereigns)-, being the market value of external assets held by an agent
i in time t given by:
∑
k
nik,tpk,t =
∑
m
qim,tpm +
∑
h
gih,tph, ∀m ∈ [0, ...,M ], h ∈ [0, ...H], k ∈ [0, ...,M +H]
where
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∑
k nik,t the total amount of external assets held by agent i in time t
pk the market price (present value) of external assets.∑
m qim,t the total amount of bank i’s claims against agents in the private sector held at time t.
pm the market price of those external assets.∑
h gih,t the total amount of bank i’s claims against agents in the public sector -governments’ debt- at time t.
ph the market price of public external assets.
We consider the following in this setup:∑
k
nik,0pk,t =
∑
m
qim,0pm +
∑
h
gih,0ph for t = 0
At time t=1 a shock in external asset n (sovereign debt) prices materialises: pn,0 → pn,1∑
k
nik,0pk,1 =
∑
m
qim,0pm +
∑
h
gih,1ph for t = 1
The previous shock changes the leverage as follows:
λi,1 =
∑
k nik,0pk,1 +
∑
j wijBj∑
k nik,0pk,1 +
∑
j wijBj − (Bi + di,0)
6= λTi (D.3)
After the price shock, at time t=2, the volume of the external asset is adjusted to meet the
target leverage, so are external liabilities. The new leverage at time t=2 is:
λi,2 =
∑
k nik,2pk,1 +
∑
j wijBj∑
k nik,2pk,1 +
∑
j wijBj − (Bi + di,2)
= λTi (D.4)
from equation D.3
λi,1
∑
k
nik,0pk,1 +
∑
j
wijBj − (Bi + di,0)
 = ∑
k
nik,0pk,1 +
∑
j
wijBj
λi,1
∑
k
nik,0pk,1 + λi,1
∑
j
wijBj − (Bi + di,0)
 = ∑
k
nik,0pk,1 +
∑
j
wijBj
(1− λi,1)
∑
j
wijBj = λi,1
[∑
k
nik,0pk,1 − (Bi + di,0)
]
−
∑
k
nik,0pk,1
∑
j
wijBj =
(λi,1 − 1)
(1− λi,1)
(∑
k
nik,0pk,1
)
− λi,1
(1− λi,1) (Bi + di,0)∑
j
wijBj = − λi,1
(1− λi,1) (Bi + di,0)−
∑
k
nik,0pk,1 (D.5)
By substituting D.5 into D.4
λi,2 =
∑
k nik,2pk,1 − λi,1(1−λi,1) (Bi + di,0)−
∑
k nik,0pk,1∑
k nik,2pk,1 − λi,1(1−λi,1) (Bi + di,0)−
∑
k nik,0pk,1 − (Bi + di,2)
λi,2 =
∆
∑
k nik,2pk,1 − λi,1(1−λi,1) (Bi + di,0)
∆
∑
k nik,2pk,1 − λi,1(1−λi,1) (Bi + di,0)− (Bi + di,2)
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where ∆
∑
k nik,2pk,1 = (
∑
k nik,2 −
∑
k nik,0)pk,1. Then:
∆
∑
k nik,2pk,1 − λi,1(1−λi,1) (Bi + di,0)
λi,2
= ∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 − λi,1
(1− λi,1) (Bi + di,0)− (Bi + di,2)
λi,1
(1− λi,1) (λi,2 − 1)(Bi + di,0) + (1− λi,2)∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 = −λi,2(Bi + di,2) (D.6)
By assumption:
di,2 − di,0 = ∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 ⇒ di,2 = di,0 + ∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1
By substituting in D.6
λi,1
(1− λi,1) (λi,2 − 1)(Bi + di,0) + (1− λi,2)∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 = −λi,2(Bi + di,0 + ∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1)
λi,1
(1− λi,1) (λi,2 − 1)(Bi + di,0) + ∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 = −λi,2(Bi + di,0)
∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 = − λi,1
(1− λi,1) (λi,2 − 1)(Bi + di,0)− λi,2(Bi + di,0)
∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 = (Bi + di,0)
[
λi,1
(1− λi,1) (λi,2 − 1)− λi,2
]
Given that
λi,1
(1− λi,1) (λi,2 − 1)− λi,2 =
λi,1
(1− λi,1) −
λi,2λi,1
(1− λi,1) − λi,2
=
λi,1
(1− λi,1) − λi,2
(
1 +
λi,1
(1− λi,1)
)
=
λi,1
(1− λi,1) − λi,2
(
1
(1− λi,1)
)
=
1
(1− λi,1) (λi,1 − λi,2) =
1
(1− λi,1) (λi,1 − λ
T
i )
then
∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 = (Bi + di,0)
1
(1− λi,1) (λi,1 − λ
T
i ) (D.7)
From equation D.5
Bi + di,0 = −1− λi,1
λi,1
∑
j
wijBj +
∑
k
nik,0pk,1

By substituting in D.7
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∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 = − (1− λi,1)
λi,1(1− λi,1)
∑
j
wijBj +
∑
k
nik,0pk,1
 (λi,1 − λTi )
⇒ ∆
∑
k
nik,2 = − (λi,1 − λ
T
i )
λi,1
[∑
j wijBj +
∑
k nik,0pk,1
]
pk,1
and dividing by nik,0
∆
∑
k nik,2
nik,0
= − (λi,1 − λ
T
i )
λi,1
[∑
j wijBj +
∑
k nik,0pk,1
]
nik,0pk,1
where
∆
∑
k nik,2
nik,0
=
nik,2−nik,0
nik,0
and
[
∑
j wijBj+nik,0pk,1]∑
k nik,0pk,1
is the ratio of the value of total assets
to the external asset k value for bank i.
Defining αik,1 as the ratio of external asset k value to total assets value, the rate of change
for asset k for bank i is:
nik,2 − nik,0
nik,0
= − 1
αik,1
(λi,1 − λTi )
λi,1
=
1
αik,1λi,1
(λTi − λi,1) (D.8)
We further modify this equation by including the parameter i capturing the bank’s reactivity
to deviations in leverage, so changes in demand are proportional to the promptness in closing
the leverage gap. Previous equation then becomes:
nik,2 − nik,0
nik,0
= − i
αik,1
(λi,1 − λTi )
λi,1
=
i
αik,1λi,1
(λTi − λi,1)
We now that
∑
k nik,0 =
∑
k nik,1, so:
nik,2 − nik,1
nik,1
= − i
αik,1
(λi,1 − λTi )
λi,1
=
i
αik,1λi,1
(λTi − λi,1)
Then:
nik,t − nik,t−1
nik,t−1
= − i
αik,t−1
(λi,t−1 − λTi )
λi,t−1
=
i
αik,t−1λi,t−1
(λTi − λi,t−1) (D.9)
Then, from the assumption of ”sticky” equity:
di,2 − di,0 = ∆
∑
k
nik,2pk,1 ⇒ from eq. D.7⇒ di,2 − di,0 = (Bi + di,0) 1
(1− λi,1) (λi,1 − λ
T
i )
Dividing by di,0:
di,2 − di,0
di,0
=
(Bi + di,0)
di,0
1
(1− λi,1) (λi,1 − λ
T
i )
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where
(Bi+di,0)
di,0
is the inverse ratio of the value of external debt to the value of total debt for
bank i. Defining this ratio of external debt value to total debt value as βi,0:
di,2 − di,0
di,0
= − 1
βi,0(λi,1 − 1)(λi,1 − λ
T
i )
having the expression for the relative change in debt for bank i:
di,2 − di,0
di,0
=
1
βi,0(λi,1 − 1)(λ
T
i − λi,1) (D.10)
After including the bank’s commitment with the target leverage:
di,2 − di,0
di,0
=
i
βi,0(λi,1 − 1)(λ
T
i − λi,1)
And considering that di,0 = di,1:
di,t − di,t−1
di,t−1
=
i
βi,t−1(λi,t−1 − 1)(λ
T
i − λi,t−1) (D.11)
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Chapter 2
International Expansion and
Riskiness of Banks
We exploit an original dataset on 15 European banks classified as G-SIBs by the BIS to assess
whether expansion in foreign markets increases their riskiness, and through which channels that
eventually happens. We find that there is a strong negative correlation between riskiness and
foreign expansion. On the one hand, banks that expand abroad more have lower riskiness so that,
given individual bank riskiness, their expansion reduced the (weighted) average riskiness of the
banks’ pool. On the other hand, foreign expansion of any given bank makes the bank and thus
the banks’ pool less risky. In terms of the channels, diversification, competition and regulation
are all important’. Expansion in destination countries with lower business cycle comovement
and stricter regulations than the origin country decreases a bank’s riskiness. As for competition,
expansion decreases riskiness only when competition in the origin country is less intense than in
the destination countries1.
Keywords: banks’ risk, global expansion, competition, diversification, regulation.
1 This chapter is based on a joint work with Esther Faia (Goethe University of Frankfurt) and Gianmarco
Ottaviano (London School of Economics). We are indebted with the European Commission for financial support
within the MACFINROBODS project. We are grateful to Yona Rubinstein for helpful discussions and Sebastien
Laffitte for outstanding research assistance.
68
2.1 Introduction
Using a newly collected dataset on global banks this paper examines from an empirical point
of view a widely debated question, namely whether banks’ internationalization has increased or
decreased risk. Many attributed the emergence of the crisis to banks’ globalization and/or more
generally to financial globalization. In 2005 Rajan (21) highlighted the potential increase in risk
contagion emerging from finance and banking globalization. A growing empirical literature is
emerging on the role that global banks have for credit expansion, liquidity management and
competition. There is not yet a definite answer on the balance between the benefits and the
dangers of the banking globalization. For instance, a recent IMF Financial Stability Report (19)
showed that prior to the 2007 global risk had increased since much of the financial globalization
took place through cross-border activity with little involvement of global banks into local retail
activity. On the contrary, after the 2007 financial crisis there has been a shift in the business
model of global banks, which currently tend to operate more through subsidiaries (occasionally
through branches). Against this background, and leveraging an original panel dataset on the
international expansion of the European banks classified as G-SIBs by the BIS from 2005 to 2014,
we first study whether and how foreign expansion has affected these banks’ riskiness. We then
target the different forces at work, investigating whether and how the impact of foreign expansion
on bank riskiness can be understood in terms of diversification, competition or regulation.
Our empirical analysis poses some methodological challenges related to reverse causation or
to potential confounding factors. We focus on assessing the effects of exogenous shocks to for-
eign expansion on bank riskiness. However banks with different riskiness may have a different
propensity to expand abroad so that any observed correlation between foreign expansion and
bank riskiness may be due to the latter endogenously affecting the former. To deal with this
problem, we follow the IV approach recently put forth by Goetz, Laeven and Levine ((17); GLL
hereafter) and Levine, Lin and Xie ((20); LLX hereafter). The two papers are complementary.
GLL assesses the impact of the geographic expansion of banks (in terms of assets) on their
riskiness (proxied by the standard deviation of stock returns) by modelling the two stage esti-
mation through an asset diversification channel. Instead LLX look at the impact of geographic
expansion through diversification on banks’ funding costs. Both papers are based on U.S. data
and geographic expansion refers to the expansion in (metropolitan statistical areas in) states
different from the one in which a bank is headquartered. The expansion decision itself, however,
could be related to its risk position or its funding costs, especially so if the expansion changes
bank’s risk-taking incentives. To tackle this endogeneity problem, both studies instrument the
observed geographic expansion of a bank with the forecast implied by a ‘gravity equation’. The
latter is estimated using the characteristics of the bank’s origin and destination markets as well
as their distance.2 The gravity estimation is an ideal candidate instrument. Indeed to the extent
that the estimation does not include variables correlated with banks’ risk, the estimated values
will be correlated with the actual expansion, but not with banks’ risk-taking behavior. Using
this instrument, GLL and LLX find that geographic expansion reduces riskiness and funding
costs respectively. GLL conjectured that this happened because of asset diversification. To test
this hypothesis they examined how the impact of geographic expansion on riskiness varies upon
the ‘similarity’ between the origin and the destination countries. They find that a key determi-
nant of the negative relation between geographic expansion and banks’ risk is the business cycle
co-movement between the origin and the destination countries. Analogously, LLX find that the
negative effect of the geographic expansion on funding costs is stronger when the origin state
co-moves less with the rest of the US.
Differently from these papers, we look at international expansion, investigating three different
transmission channels. We re-consider the diversification channel, but we also test the presence
of a competition and of a regulation channel. The competition channel is motivated by results in
2The gravity equation has been extensively and successfully used to explain international flows of goods and
services. See Appendix C for an overview.
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the theoretical literature. Allen and Gale (1) had shown that competition in the deposit market
tends to increase banks’ risk-taking: as banks need to offer higher rates to entice investors into
demand deposits, they also need to search for higher yield/risk assets. This result was challenged
by Boyd and De Nicolo (2)), who showed that higher competition in the loan market tends to
reduce banks’ risk-taking. As more banks serve the loan markets, the rates shall decline and this
brings about a decline in assets’ risk. Recently Faia and Ottaviano (2016) have re-examined the
link between banks’ risk-taking and competition with a model featuring competition on both
deposits’ and loans’ markets and allowing banks for the possibility to enter foreign markets,
which are characterized by higher monitoring costs. They have shown that the link between
competition and risk-taking depends on the balance between the relative strength of the deposit
and the loans’ markets competition, but that generally speaking for empirically relevant demand
functions (for deposits and loans) banks’ penetration in foreign market tends to reduce banks’
risk-taking.
Our empirical findings can summarized as follows. First, there is a strong negative corre-
lation between riskiness and foreign expansion. Using OLS with bank fixed effects to net out
composition effects and to account for within variation, we find that regressing riskiness on for-
eign expansion produces a statistically significant and negative coefficient. Second, we test a
selection channel (only low risk banks expand) by comparing OLS with and without bank fixed
effects. Such comparison reveals negative selection effect, since we find a negative coefficient for
the regression of openings on banks’ risk. Third, to rule out the possibility of a reverse causality
effect (banks’ risk-taking behavior affects foreign expansion), we use a 2SLS with gravity-based
IV. Under this specification the regression of riskiness on foreign expansion produces a larger (in
absolute value) negative coefficient than with OLS.
To sum up, foreign expansion reduces the riskiness of the pool of banks in our sample. Banks
that expand abroad have lower riskiness (‘between effect’) and foreign expansion renders any
bank less prone to risk (‘within effect’). The ‘between effect’ is, however, less robust than the
‘within effect’.
Next, we test which of the above-described channels is responsible for the results. We find
evidence that diversification, competition and regulation all play a role in understanding the
‘within effect’. In line with the diversification and regulation channels, expansion in destination
countries exhibiting lower business cycle co-movement and stricter regulation than the origin
country decreases a bank’s riskiness. As for competition, expansion has a lower impact on
riskiness when competition in the origin country is less intense than in the destination countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the novel dataset. Section
3 presents the empirical strategy and the results. Section 4 reports the findings related to the
different transmission channels. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Data
Our analysis exploits an original database on banks’ geographic expansion that documents the
evolution of banking globalization for a 10-year time period (2005 to 2014) and that captures
recent trends in the international expansion of European banking groups. The data, related to
banks’ presence in Europe, cover a diversified range of European economies. Our dataset consists
in panel data on foreign expansion decisions (i.e. decisions on entering a foreign market) for the
European banks classified as G-SIBs by the BCBS by the end of 2015 ((3)). Based on this we
have identified 15 banks in located 8 home countries and 38 potential destination countries (see
appendix A for the complete list of countries included in the dataset). The panel is balanced,
as we consider for each bank all potential host countries and years, even if the bank did not
establish presence in a foreign country within a specific year and despite the presence of not
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available information -missing values- in our sample.3
The data has been manually collected using Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope, Zephyr, Bankers
Almanac dataset and Bloomberg. Several other complementary sources have been used, such
as banks’ annual reports, consolidated statements, websites, archives press releases, and report
from national central banks, regulatory agencies, international organizations and financial in-
stitutions. Finally, the dataset is extended with geographic data that come from the CEPII’s
gravity dataset4.
We measure international banking expansion by the count of global banks’ entries in foreign
economies by year, which are given by the number of foreign unit openings5. We define an
opening in a host country as a parent bank applying one of the following growth strategies:
‘Organic growth’ by opening directly a new foreign branch or subsidiary or increasing the activity
of already-existing units; ‘Merger and Acquisition’ through purchases of interest in local banks
(ownership ≥ 50%) or takeovers; and ‘Joint ventures’. Therefore, we consider that a bank enters
a foreign market whenever it opens directly a branch or a subsidiary, or acquires, either directly
or indirectly, a foreign entity, owning at least 50%. The opening would take place in this case
either by increasing own ownership in an already-controlled institution or by acquiring a majority
interest in a new one. We do not consider as an opening any new institution resulting from the
merger among previously-owned group’s entities. The establishment of representative offices,
customer desks and the change of legal entity type (branch/ subsidiary) are disregarded as well.
The parent bank is listed even if the opening was actually implemented by a foreign unit owned
by the bank. Nevertheless, the count of openings that we use does not reflect the actual scale
of events in each of the host countries, as we do not account for the branch network that an
owned foreign unit may develop once it has entered the host economy. When the entering in the
foreign market takes place through the acquisition of another institution, we count this opening
as a single one, independently of the number of different entities belonging to the acquired one
already present in that market. To maximize the precision we also obtained year-by-year detailed
information on banking global strategies and ownership, extending the traditional sampling.
Our sample includes universal banks performing traditional retail and commercial banking
services. But we also account for independent affiliates providing other banking services (pri-
vate and investment banking, asset and wealth management ), financial joint ventures, leasing
companies holding the status of banks or MFI, factoring companies performing pure commercial
credit-related activities. Consequently, the financial institutions in our sample are entities pro-
viding commercial and investment banking services (retail banking, private, banking, corporate
and investment banking, asset management, etc). To sum up, our global banks are more akin to
universal banks. This is understandable in light of the fact that large banks in Europe tend to
operate as. Indeed our sample includes the top ten financial groups in Europe in terms of total
assets. The banks considered are: BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole Group and Société Générale
in France; Banco Santander in Spain; Unicredit in Italy; HSBC, Standard Chartered, RBS and
Barclays in the United Kingdom; Deutsche Bank in Germany; ING Bank in the Netherlands;
UBS and Credit Suisse in Switzerland and Nordea in Sweden. We also consider BPCE, a banking
group consisting of independent, but complementary commercial banking networks that provide
also wholesale banking, asset management and financial services. Entities such as mutual and
pension fund, trusts, financial holdings companies, instrumental corporations or affiliates per-
forming activities related to private equity, advisory, real estate or insurance have been excluded
from our sample. However, we consider joint ventures or leasing companies that hold the status
of banks (according to Bankscope classification) or Monetary Financial Institutions (as defined
by the European Central Bank), together with factoring companies, but only when these per-
form pure commercial-credit-related activities, as they can all be classified as consumer finance
3If the bank did not establish presence in a foreign country within a specific year the count of its openings is
set equal to zero.
4This is available at: http : //www.cepii.fr/cepii/fr/bddmodele/presentation.asp?id = 6.
5Foreign units refer to incorporated foreign banks or financial companies with over a 50 percent ownership.
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Figure 2.1: Foreign expansion of banks over the sample period.
activities (retail banking).
We have focused on direct and indirect group’s cross-border exposures, by considering both
forms of penetration, namely branches and subsidiaries. Additionally, double counting has been
avoided. Concerning take-overs, only the merged entity or the acquiring bank remained in the
sample, while in terms of ownership, holding companies were excluded in countries where the
banking group itself is present. As for ownership of a foreign unit, this has been determined
based on both direct and indirect ownership structure. A bank or financial company is consid-
ered foreign-owned if at least 50% of shares are owned by the parent bank (see also Claessens,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga(11); Clarke et al. (12)).
Based on the above-mentioned criteria, we identified 444 opening events in 38 host countries
during the period 2005− 20146. These events are listed in Table B.1 in Appendix B. This table
shows that the largest number of events took place in Western Europe. Germany and Italy
experienced the largest number of foreign bank units openings, while the smallest number is
observed in CEE countries. Approximately half of the openings in the sample period occurred in
the years prior to the crisis. The rate of growth of foreign-bank incorporation shows a substantial
decrease (almost a 80%) over the period considered. Even if annual decreases persisted from
2005 to 2012, the rate picked up in 2013 and 2014. Nevertheless, the number of openings in
those last years was low in absolute terms compared to the number at beginning of the sample
period. The largest drops in growth rates concentrated between 2008 and 2012, namely the
period between the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the euro area crisis of 2008-2012.
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of foreign expansion by bank and year. The internationaliza-
tion process was deeper during the pre-crisis period, with the exception of some financial groups
such as BNP Paribas or Crèdit Agricole. The former’s notable expansion in 2009 was principally
due to the acquisition of the Dutch Fortis, whereas the latter’s was essentially the result of an
increase of retail banking activities (Consumer Finance) in several countries in 2008.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the number of openings by origin country. Over the sample period
the country that expanded the most was France, followed by the United Kingdom and Italy.
From 2005 to 2014, French banks registered 229 events, while British and Italian ones 73 and
51, respectively. If the openings per bank are considered, France and Italy were by far the most
globalizing origin countries in terms of banking expansion.
We measure the riskiness of a bank using two different measures: a market-based variable,
namely the Credit Default Swap price (CDS hereafter) and a book-based variable, namely the
6Countries and opening events are listed in Appendixes ?? and ?? respectively.
72
Figure 2.2: Openings of foreign bank units by home country and year.
Loan-loss provisions to total loans. The CDS price corresponds to the price of the insurance
against the default of the company. This is an overall measure of bank’s risk (both on the
asset and the liability side) as priced by the market. The higher the CDS price, the higher
the risk taken by the seller of the CDS and the higher the defaulting probability as seen by
the market. The advantages of using this measure are two. First, it captures several aspects
of banks’ risk. Second, the assessment of risk is done by the market, hence it is not biased by
possible banks’ manipulations. The disadvantage of this measure is that it might be subject to
market exuberance, hence it tends to be more volatile than other book-value metrics. In our
case this disadvantage is offset by the fact that we take the average CDS price over the year.
The loan-loss provisions to total loans correspond to the provisions that the banks set aside to
cover losses in the eventuality of defaulting borrowers. Hence the second metric captures more
the risk of lending firms’ defaulting. For a given level of total assets, a higher level of loan loss
provision indicates a higher probability of loss on loans (less solvent borrowers). The advantage
of using this second metrics is that it is immune from market exuberance. On the other side it
is a narrower indicator as it captures only loan portfolio risk while a bank might invest in other
risky assets and/or hold a risky liability structure.
In any case it seems at first glance that the two metrics are highly correlated (see Figure
2.3 below). We will however see below that the metric might provide different answers when we
examine regressions without bank-year fixed effects.
In Figure 2.4 we display the yearly average CDS price of all banks, the minimum and the
maximum CDS price in our sample (left axis) and the total number of openings (right axis). The
latter is a proxy for the magnitude of bank’s geographic expansion. The effect of the financial
crisis on CDS prices is observed from 2008 and it is correlated with a drop in the total number
of openings of G-SIB banks in Europe.
The dataset also contains a set of financial indicators. Bank’s size proxied by total assets,
overall financial health and strength (proxied alternatively by the loan-to-loss provisions to the
loans’ ratio, by the capital ratio and by the Tier1-to-assets ratio) and banks’ profitability (proxied
by the Return on Assets) are extracted from Bankscope and used as controls.
Next, following LLX(20) and GLL(17), we measure diversification by computing the following
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Figure 2.3: Average CDS Price in the sample
Figure 2.4: Average CDS Price in the sample
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(cds) 140 4.148594 1.077247 1.927346 5.861315
Loan loss provisions to total loans 138 2.118043 1.724864 .2 9.63
Expansion 150 2.96 4.768296 0 29
ln(tot assets) 150 13.97037 .4758832 12.27884 14.80599
ROA bank 139 .3582014 .4461254 -1.61 1.14
Income diversity 139 .7029369 .4935113 -4.418854 .9933677
Asset diversity 139 .7176454 .1773021 .2339715 .9990997
Capital ratio 130 14.33462 3.395106 8.87 25.6
Tier1/Assets 131 46.92355 14.7732 12.81485 81.11484
Deposits/Assets 139 665.2518 149.5965 331.7435 1257.695
indicators of income diversity and asset diversity:
Income Diversity =
|Interest inc.− noninterest inc.|
Total income
and
Asset Diversity =
|Loans−Other assets|
Total assets
.
At last, the degree of competition in banking is measured at country level by one minus
the Herfindhal index and the Hirschman Index, both variables are provided by the European
Central Bank. To gauge a country’s degree of regulation, we include the Macroprudential Index
(MPI) taken from Cerutti, Claessens and Laeven(5)). Finally, to control for particular links
between countries, dyadic gravity variables are considered.
Table 2.1 summarizes some basic statistics regarding the variables that will be used in our
analysis7.
2.3 Foreign Expansion and Riskiness
In this section we explore the impact of banks’ expansion abroad upon their riskiness. As pre-
viously discussed the potential endogeneity problem is dealt through an instrumental variable
approach. Our instrument will be given by the estimated gravity between the country of ori-
gin and the destination country. The channels through which this impact materializes will be
investigated in the next section.
2.3.1 Endogeneity and Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of foreign expansion on riskiness, we consider bank k headquartered in
country i expanding to country j 6= i in year t. We estimate the following regression by OLS:
Riskinesskt = α+ β1 · Expansionkt + Zkt · Γ + µk + µt + kt, (2.1)
where Riskinesskt is measured by the (Naperian) logarithm of the bank’s average CDS price
over year t, Expansionkt corresponds to its total number of openings and Zkt is a set of control
variables. We include time fixed effects (µt) to control for a specific trend in the data (the crisis
of 2007 and its consequences hereafter) and bank fixed effects (µk) to account for the constant
bank-specific factors that influence the riskiness of the bank. In this specification, the results
have thus to be interpreted as materializing within bank.
7Income diversity is negative because we have some negative values for non-interest income.
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The OLS estimate could, however, be biased if the bank’s expansion decision were related to
its risk conditions, especially so if the bank expects that its geographic expansion could have an
impact on its risk-taking. If the bank believes that expansion could reduce its riskiness, then its
decision to go abroad could be driven by an increase in riskiness. In this case the OLS estimate
of β1 would be biased upwards. To deal with this potential endogeneity bias, we use an IV
strategy similar to GLL(17) and LLX(20). The observed geographic expansion of the bank will be
instrumented with the one predicted by a gravity equation. This method is akin to the one used
in Frankel and Romer (15) who study the impact of international trade on countries’ economic
performance by instrumenting the observed bilateral trade flows (which arguably depend on
countries’ economic performance) with the equivalent predicted by geographic variables and
fixed country characteristics. To the extent that our gravity estimation does not include variables
correlated with the risk-taking behavior of the bank, the instrument is correlated with actual
openings but not with banks’ risk.
Operationally, we proceed as follows. At first (stage zero), we compute the predicted bilateral
openings from a gravity regression of actual openings in country j by bank k headquartered in
country i at date t:
Openingskjt = Xkjt · β + νjt + νk + εkjt (2.2)
where Xkjt are the standard dyadic gravity variables (e.g. distance, common border, common
language, etc.), νjt is a country-time fixed effect and νk is a bank fixed effect. Second, we
aggregate the bilateral predicted counts across destinations to obtain a prediction of the total
number of openings of bank k at date t:
Expansionpredkt =
∑
j 6=i
(
Xkjt · β̂ + ν̂jt + ν̂k
)
. (2.3)
It is worth noting that we include fixed effects that are not correlated with changes in the
bank’s risk. If we had followed the structural trade gravity framework, we would have to include
bank-time fixed effects and hosting-country-time fixed effects. However this inclusion would have
made our instrument correlated with changes in the bank’s risk. We also repeat the procedure
above using no fixed effects at all. This will serve as an alternative instrument.
Equation (2.2) is estimated using Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML hereafter).
The OLS estimator is not appropriate for count data like ours for three reasons. First, assump-
tions on normality are not likely to be fulfilled by count models. Second, the OLS estimator
could generate negative predictions in the case of count data. Third, the OLS estimator is less
apt than a Poisson estimator to deal with the large number of zeros in our count data. Poisson
regressions are, therefore, much better suited for our case. In addition note that we use the
PPML estimator since this is robust to distribution mis-specification (Cameron and Triverdi(4),
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro(22)). As it is standard in gravity models, we cluster standards errors
at the country-pair level (Head and Mayer (18) and Yotov et al. 2016).
Equation (2.2) does not account for the fact that different openings may have different size
and thus different relevance for the bank. To take this into account, we also construct a weighted
measure of predicted expansion, using the share of openings of all other banks in country j to
proxy for the relative size of bank i’s openings in that country. In this way the weights can be
considered exogenous to bank k’s choices. Specifically, we define the weight ωkjt attached to
Openingskjt as follows:
ωkjt = 1 +
∑
h6=k openingshjt · total_assetshjt∑
j
∑
h 6=k openingshjt · total_assetshjt
∈ [1, 2]. (2.4)
In our data ωkjt ranges between 1 and 1.32, taking low (high) values for countries of little
(great) importance for banks’ total assets – which are likely to host small (large) openings. The
countries with low values are Albania, Bosnia, Cyprus, Estonia or Iceland, the ones with high
76
values are Germany, Luxembourg, Poland or Spain. The weighted predicted expansion can then
be written as:
Expansionwpredkt =
∑
j 6=i
ωkjt
(
Xkjt · β̂ + ν̂jt + ν̂k
)
(2.5)
We will estimate two stage least squares for both the weighted and the unweighted expansion
equation. Our two-stage approach consists of the following procedure. In the first stage we
estimate the regression of actual openings on predicted ones. We will then use this estimate to
instrument openings in the second stage when we will regress riskiness on expansion.
2.3.2 First Stage: Gravity Prediction
The results of the gravity estimation are reported in table 2.2. We employ three different
specifications for the gravity equation. The first is more in line with standard estimations
conducted in the gravity literature: we therefore compare the results of this model with previous
ones in the literature. The second and the third specifications are however better suited to provide
us with an instrument as we explain below. In all three specifications the regressors include
log(distance), contiguity, the official common language, the common belonging to the European
Union or to the Eurozone and the difference in the legal systems. The three specifications differ
primarily in the full or partial inclusion of the fixed effects.
We display in column (1) the results of the gravity model estimated with the full set of
fixed effects. This specification, which is more in line with the ones employed in the traditional
gravity literature, allows us to account for multilateral resistance terms (see Head and Mayer
(18)). Multilateral resistance between two countries is the average barrier of the two regions
with all their partners (see Van Wincoop and Anderson (? )). Considering the opening of a
new bank branch in Europe, multilateral resistance corresponds to the average barriers to the
banking investment with all other countries. For given bilateral barriers between two countries, i
and j, higher barriers between i and other countries is likely to raise the number of new branches
that a bank headquartered in country j opens in country i. We do not use however the predicted
gravity value from this specification as our instrument. Indeed the presence of the bank-year
fixed effects, a factor which is likely to be correlated with bank risk, would make the predicted
gravity correlated with the dependent variable of our second stage. Hence the endogeneity
problem would remain. Nevertheless it is instructive to discuss the results of this specification.
First, the estimation delivers an elasticity of openings to distance of −0.662. The magnitude
of this coefficient is discussed and compared with other banking gravity papers in Appendix C.
Second and surprisingly, sharing a common language has a negative impact on bilateral banks
openings. This could be due to the fact that official common language is collinear to the distance
or the continuity in our sample. Third, being members of the European Union and the Eurozone
does not have any impact in this specification. At last and as expected, having a different legal
system in the host country compared to the country of origin has an important negative impact
on banks openings.
In column (2), we estimate the same gravity equation but without any fixed effects. The
estimated gravity from this model is one of our candidate instruments. The elasticity to distance
is a bit lower in this case. Contiguity or the common belonging to the European Union or the
Eurozone now have a positive and significant impact on banking gravity.
Finally, we estimate the specification in column (3), which includes bank and host-year fixed
effects. In our view this specification deliver the best instrument, albeit we also employ the
predicted value implied by the second specification. Results for this case are very close to the
ones with the full set of fixed effects. When the instrument is estimated with this set of fixed
effects, it is generated using out-of-sample prediction, ignoring that observations that are always
0 for the couplet (source country, host country) are dropped from the estimation.
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Table 2.2: Banking gravity
PPML (1) PPML (2) PPML (3)
ln(distance) -0.662*** -0.553*** -0.651***
(0.170) (0.149) (0.173)
Contiguity 0.0367 0.910*** 0.104
(0.219) (0.266) (0.212)
Off. common lang. -0.719* -0.921*** -0.663*
(0.391) (0.271) (0.360)
EUij 0.690 0.984* 0.932*
(0.524) (0.592) (0.512)
Euroij -0.382 0.714*** -0.294
(0.277) (0.201) (0.276)
Diff. legal syst. -0.629** -0.123 -0.694**
(0.310) (0.171) (0.275)
Observations 2,109 5,550 2,896
R-squared 0.296 0.026 0.193
Fixed effects Bank-year host-year No FE Bank et host-year
Robust standard errors clustered at the bank-hosting-country level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.3.3 Causal Effects of Expansion on Riskiness
We now test the impact of expansion on riskiness. We do so by comparing the OLS estimates
with the two-stage using gravity prediction as an instrument. We also compare specifications
with different assumptions on the fixed effects. Controls used in the various specifications include
expansion, log(total assets), return on assets, income diversity, asset diversity, the ratios for the
headquartered bank of capital, Tier 1 over assets and deposits over assets.
In Table 2.3 columns 1, 4 and 7 show OLS estimates, while the rest show 2SLS. All regressions
in this Table do not include bank fixed effects. This allows us to provide a ‘between’ interpretation
of the results, as it reveals if high levels of openings are related to low bank riskiness. We keep
time fixed effects to account for the common trend of CDS prices. Column (1) shows the OLS
estimates by controlling only for the size of the bank in terms of assets. This baseline specification
delivers a negative and significant correlation between expansion and riskiness. In other words,
banks tend to expand abroad when they are less risky. We dissect the negative relation by
dividing our CDS variable in quantiles. When we do so we observe a statistically significant
difference in terms of openings among the quartiles. In the first quartile of CDS prices banks
open on average 6.2 affiliates per year; banks in the second quartile open on average 3.7 affiliates
per year; the remaining banks open on average 1.6 affiliates per year. This difference could be
explained in our case by the economic crisis of 2007-2008 that increased banks’ CDS price and
reduced foreign expansion of banks. At last notice that the negative correlation holds when we
control for bank-specific variables in columns (4) and (7).
The other columns of Table 2.3 account for the potential endogeneity bias using the instru-
ment computed in the first stage. We must note that the instrument generated using a gravity
model with fixed effects (column 3 of Table2.2) performs better (in terms of F-stat) than the one
generated without fixed effects (column 2 of Table2.2), albeit both exhibit reasonable F-stats.
Columns 2, 5 and 8 show results using the instrument estimated without fixed effects, while
columns 3, 6 and 9 shows results using the instrument estimated with fixed effects. Overall first-
stage-regression coefficients have the sign and the magnitude expected. For both instruments,
there is a positive and almost unitary correlation between predicted and actual expansion. In
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columns (2) and (3) we do not find any causal effect from expansion to riskiness: banks that
expand more are on average less risky but do not become less risky because they expand more.
Controlling for more bank-level characteristics, we find in column (6) a negative and significant
coefficient, but this effect disappears when we change some control variables. All in all, the
‘between’ causal effect of expansion on riskiness is not very robust.8
In Table 2.4, we run exactly the same regression on the weighted expansion measure. Results
are very similar to the ones of Table 2.3, thereby confirming results also when we account for
the size of the openings.
In Table 2.5, we add bank-year fixed effects to our regressions in order to look at the results
‘within’ the bank. These estimations are informative on the causal effect from geographic ex-
pansion to the riskiness of each bank. Once again in columns (1), (4) and (7), we show OLS
estimates with different sets of controls and instruments. In all three cases, we find again a
robust negative correlation between expansion and riskiness. A bank expands abroad when it is
less risky. There is also a positive, albeit not robust, effect of bank size on riskiness. Turning to
the 2SLS estimation (columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8,9), we find a negative coefficient on expansion which
is robust to different sets of controls. The geographic expansion of a bank tends to decrease its
riskiness. The coefficient is larger (in absolute terms) than the one in the OLS estimation. In
column (2) each new opening abroad decreases the price of the CDS by 3.5% (the other 2SLS
columns can be interpreted analogously). If we consider the median number of openings by year,
that is 1, expansion abroad reduces the CDS price by 3.5%. For banks that open 4 affiliates in
a given year (corresponding to the fourth quartile), these openings contributes to a decrease of
the CDS price by 14%. The results confirm our hypothesis that the OLS estimates are upwardly
biased.
Several other results stand out. In column (2), the first-stage regression has a surprisingly
large coefficient of 28.66. This is due to the use of fixed effects in the first stage compared with
the ‘zero stage’ where we do not use fixed effects to generate the prediction. The results of
columns (2) to (6) show a positive effect of size on riskiness, probably due to the fact that bigger
banks were more exposed during the crisis. Larger income diversity (between interest and non-
interest income) has a negative effect on the riskiness of the bank (columns (4) to (9)). Higher
ratios of Tier1 capital to total assets and of deposits to total assets are consistently associated
with lower riskiness of the banks as measured using CDS prices. This message is reasonable:
well capitalized banks are priced better in terms of risk by the market. Both instruments (the
one estimated with fixed effects and the one estimated without fixed effects) give similar and
consistent results associated with a large F-stat.
In Table 2.6, we run the same estimation on the weighted expansion measure. Results are
very similar to the ones of Table 2.3, confirming that they hold even when accounting for the
size of the openings.
8It could be explained by the fact that when a bank is more risky (when the price of its CDS is higher), the
probability of default is higher and expansion is likely to be limited. In our case, banks became more risky at the
moment of the economic crisis of 2008 (see Figure 2.4), and they expanded less during this period.
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Next we test the robustness of our results by changing the risk metric. In the following
tables, we move from a market-based measure of bank risk to a book-based measure, namely
the loan-loss provisions to total loans. The first metric captures overall bank risk (both on the
asset and the liability side) as measured by the market. The second metric captures more banks’
asset risk. Both measures have similar trends, especially since the financial crisis impacted the
two in a similar way (see figure 2.5). In Table 2.7, we run the estimation without any fixed
effects. OLS regressions in columns (1), (4) and (7) illustrate that banks with higher loan loss
provisions (hence riskier ones) expand more. This effect is opposite to the one found in Table
2.3. Accordingly, there is a selection in the expansion of banks that have low CDS price, but
high loan loss provisions to total loans. This could be explained by the fact that the correlation
between CDS and LLP is different across banks as illustrated by Table 2.3.3.
Figure 2.5: Correlation between LLP and CDS
Turning to the 2SLS estimations, we find a systematically strong positive impact of expansion
on the loan loss provision ratio, which seems to confirm the selection effect just highlighted.
Several other results stand out. We find a positive effect of the return on assets on the riskiness
of the bank. This is intuitive and captures a search for yield effect: banks who invest in higher
yield assets also exhibit a riskier asset portfolio. We also find a positive effect of the capital
to asset ratio and the Tier1 to asset ratio on riskiness. This is well explained by the Basel II
pro-cyclicality of the regulatory ratios. As asset risk raises the regulator imposes to the bank
to increase the regulatory ratios. This does not contradict the result highlighted in Table2.5,
namely that well capitalized banks are considered sound in terms of risk the market
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In Table 2.8, we run the same regressions on the weighted expansion measure. Results are
very similar to the ones of Table 2.8, confirming robustness when we account for the size of the
openings.
In Table 2.9 we re-estimate the above specifications, whose dependent variable is given by
the loan loss provisions over loans, but add bank-year effects. Results have, therefore, a ‘within’
interpretation. In the three different OLS specifications (as usual columns 1, 4 and 7), the coef-
ficient for expansion is always insignificantly different from zero. Accordingly, expansion seems
to have no effect on the bank’s asset risk. As for 2SLS estimation, we have again a very high
coefficient on our first stage for the first instrument that is likely due to the inclusion of fixed
effects. F-stats are again relatively high, and the first stage for our second instrument (the one
estimated through a gravity with fixed effects) is as expected. In all cases, we find that expan-
sion has an effect on riskiness. When a bank expands abroad, its riskiness measured by the
loan-loss ratio decreases. With both instruments, coefficients are larger in absolute value than
the OLS coefficients but, when the instrument is generated using a gravity model without fixed
effects, the coefficient is twice as large. To quantify the impact of expansion on the bank’s risk
consider column 9. This is indeed our preferred specification since in this case the instrument is
extracted from a gravity equation with fixed effects. In this case the median number of openings
in a year (1 opening) decreases the bank’s loan-loss provisions ratio by 0.08 percentage points.
For 4 openings (corresponding to the fourth quartile of openings), geographic expansion reduces
the loan loss provisions to asset ratio by 0.32 percentage points (the average ratio being 2.16).
These findings suggests that expansion has an effect on the quality/risk of loans granted by the
banks since the provisions for loan loss decreases after the expansion. The results are robust to
different set of fixed effects.
In Table 2.10, we run the same estimation as before but on the weighted expansion measure.
Results are very similar to the ones of Table 2.10. Our results hold also when we account for
opening size.
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2.4 Diversification, Competition and Regulation
In this section we dissect our previous results and explore the channels driving them. We consider
three different channels: asset diversification, competition and regulation. The first channel
has been already examined in past empirical literature based on U.S. data (see GLL(17) and
LLX(20)). The second channel has been extensively explored in the theoretical literature with
alternative results (see Allen and Gale(1),Boyd and De Nicolo’(2) and Faia and Ottaviano(14)),
but has received little or no attention in the empirical literature. The third channel received
also extensive attention by commentators who envisaged as motivation for banks’ expansion an
interest for regulatory arbitrage. In the years prior to the crisis regulations varied significantly
across countries (despite the Basel suggestions which were common to all countries). Hence
banks headquartered in countries with stricter regulations had an interest to expand in countries
with laxer regulations. Below we explore the importance of those three channels.
Before turning to the regressions a few observations might give a first glance of how the
channels operate (see also Appendix D for more details). Origin countries tend to be rather dif-
ferent from other countries in terms of diversification, competition and regulation. In particular,
origin countries have on average higher business cycle comovement with the rest of the Europe
(0.92 against 0.8 in terms of growth correlation), more competition (0.92 against 0.87 in terms
of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and more similar regulation9. Also destination countries exhibit
even larger differences than origin countries with respect to the rest of Europe. In our sample,
75% of all openings take place in countries that have less comovement with the rest of the Europe
than the origin country, 54% in countries that have a stricter regulation and 59% in countries
that are less competitive. This seems to suggest that banks tend to expand to countries whose
business cycles are less correlated with the rest of Europe than in the origin country, to countries
that are less competitive than the country of origin, and to countries with better regulation.
Several considerations might emerge from the observations above. We focus however on ex-
amining whether the negative impact of foreign expansion on a bank’s riskiness varies when
expansion involves countries with different degrees of business comovement, competition or reg-
ulation. In other words we exploit variations in destination countries with respect to several
indicators (diversification, competition and regulations) and relatively to the country of origin
to examine how the various channels contribute to the negative relation between expansion and
risk.
9See Table D.1 in Appendix D for additional details.
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2.4.1 Diversification
First, we test the impact of the diversification motive on the relation between risk and expansion.
We do so by exploiting the variations in destination country’s co-movement vis-vis the rest
of the area and relatively to the country of origin co-movement. We therefore define a new
variable that proxies business cycle co-movement (we label it with the acronym cmv) with the
correlation of a country growth rate with the growth rate in all other countries in the sample,
distinguishing between expansions to destination countries with higher and lower business cycle
co-movement than the origin country. To address the problem of endogeneity with these two
types of expansions, we then repeat our 2SLS with two new instruments: the predicted expansion
to countries with higher co-movement than the origin country; and the predicted expansion to
countries with lower comovement than the origin country. Our initial baseline instrument is the
one generated through the gravity estimation with bank and year fixed effects. This choice is
motivated by the fact that the other instruments have a very low correlation with the actual
openings. Except for the change in instruments all other controls remain the same as before.
The corresponding results are reported in Table 2.11. The dependent variable is the CDS
price. We focus on this as this is a all encompassing metric of risk. We use the unweighted
instrument in the first two-columns and the weighted one in the second two columns. OLS
estimates (columns 1 and 3) suggest that it is openings in countries with higher comovement
that drive the overall negative impact of foreign expansion on bank riskiness. However, once
the endogeneity bias is removed, 2SLS estimates (columns 2 and 4) reveal that it is rather the
expansion in countries with lower comovement that drives the overall effect. This result is line
with those in GLL(17) and LLX(20). Banks’ asset diversification is achieved by investing in
countries which are less correlated to the area than the origin country is. Therefore, foreign
expansion negatively causes riskiness, when it leads to more risk diversification.
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Table 2.11: Testing for the diversification channel. Dependent variable: CDS prices. OLS and
2SLS regressions with bank-year fixed effects. Unweighted instrument in the first two-columns
and weighted instrument in the second two columns.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Exp. when cmvj < cmvi -0.0143*** -0.0393***
(0.00376) (0.0124)
Exp. when cmvj > cmvi -0.000146 -0.104**
(0.0139) (0.0471)
Exp. w when cmvj < cmvi -0.0137*** -0.0381***
(0.00360) (0.0119)
Exp. w when cmvj > cmvi -0.000204 -0.101**
(0.0134) (0.0454)
ln(Tot Assets) -0.0200 -0.122 -0.0204 -0.121
(0.126) (0.132) (0.126) (0.132)
ROA -0.00632 0.0183 -0.00617 0.0184
(0.0730) (0.0810) (0.0730) (0.0808)
Income diversity -0.119*** -0.0937** -0.119*** -0.0923**
(0.0366) (0.0415) (0.0367) (0.0417)
Asset diversity 0.202 0.910** 0.200 0.896**
(0.306) (0.416) (0.306) (0.414)
Tier1/Asset -0.00988* -0.0202*** -0.00987* -0.0201***
(0.00515) (0.00616) (0.00514) (0.00612)
Deposits/Asset -0.000652*** -0.000168 -0.000652*** -0.000175
(0.000206) (0.000449) (0.000206) (0.000446)
Observations 141 141 141 141
R-squared 0.974 0.952 0.974 0.952
FE bank year bank year bank year bank year
Instr. pred. k jt pred. k jt
F-Test 1st 6.496 6.565
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.4.2 Competition
Next we test the impact of variations in competition for the usual relation. We now turn to com-
petition, which we measure (inversely) through the canonical indicator of market concentration
in the destination country, namely the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry concentration
(HHI). We then partition origin countries in two groups depending on whether their HHI is
higher or lower than the median HHI among origin countries, and we define a ‘low competition’
dummy variable that takes value 1 for origin countries with higher-than-median HHI and 0
otherwise.10 As in the case of diversification, having to deal with two types of expansions (from
higher-than-median and from lower-than-median HHI countries), we use two instruments: the
predicted expansion (with bank-year fixed effects); and the predicted expansion interacted with
the low competition dummy.
The results are reported in Table 2.12 which is constructed in a similar way as Table 2.11.
Results show that banks headquartered in countries with a higher level of competition (lower-
than-medianHHI) have lower riskiness. It also shows that expansion for banks headquartered in
those countries reduces bank riskiness less than expansion from the other countries. Actually, on
net the effect of expanding from higher competition countries is essentially null. Therefore, the
overall negative impact of expansion on bank riskiness is entirely driven by banks expanding from
countries that are less competitive (higher-than-median HHI). This finding can be rationalized
in the wake of Faia and Ottaviano (14). In the logic of their model, more competition has two
opposite effects in the markets of funds (deposits) and loans when banks have market power in
both. On the one hand, tougher competition in the banks’ funding market increases the interest
rate banks pay as it reduces their oligopsonistic power. On the other hand, tougher competition
in the market for loans decreases the spread (‘markup’) between the interest rate banks earn
on loans and the interested rate they pay on funds due to weakened oligopolistic power. Due
to moral hazard investors finance more risky projects when the interest rate on loans is higher,
but the effect of competition on this interest rate is generally ambiguous depending on whether
the oligopsonistic effect or the opposing oligopolistic effect dominates. In our sample expansion
from less competitive markets drives the overall fall in bank riskiness. In light of the Faia
and Ottaviano (14) model, this would be consistent with the negative oligopolistic effect of
competition on the spread dominating its positive oligopsonistic effect on funding costs as long
as expanding from less competitive countries increased the competitive pressure on banks.
10The median HHI among origin countries corresponds to the bottom 20% HHI among all countries in the
sample.
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Table 2.12: Testing for the competition channel. Dependent variable: CDS prices. OLS and
2SLS regressions with bank-year fixed effects. Unweighted instrument in the first two-columns
and weighted instrument in the second two columns.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Expansion -0.0181*** -0.0673***
(0.00513) (0.0204)
Expansion * 1low hhi in i 0.0137** 0.0617***
(0.00687) (0.0205)
Expansion w -0.0173*** -0.0642***
(0.00490) (0.0196)
Expansion * 1low hhi in i w 0.0131* 0.0590***
(0.00666) (0.0198)
1low hhi in i -0.0944 -0.379*** -0.0942 -0.378***
(0.0956) (0.120) (0.0959) (0.121)
ln(Tot Assets) -0.0224 0.0184 -0.0227 0.0167
(0.125) (0.118) (0.125) (0.118)
ROA 0.00208 0.0227 0.00209 0.0228
(0.0703) (0.0610) (0.0703) (0.0608)
Income diversity -0.114*** -0.105*** -0.114*** -0.104***
(0.0358) (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0360)
Asset diversity 0.0935 -0.0289 0.0916 -0.0312
(0.317) (0.283) (0.317) (0.284)
Tier1/Asset -0.00971* -0.00846 -0.00969* -0.00847
(0.00495) (0.00520) (0.00495) (0.00519)
Deposits/Asset -0.000616*** -0.000635* -0.000617*** -0.000638*
(0.000187) (0.000332) (0.000187) (0.000328)
Observations 141 141 141 141
R-squared 0.975 0.958 0.975 0.958
FE bank year bank year bank year bank year
Instr. pred. k jt pred. k jt
F-Test 1st 6.853 6.509
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Channels: Regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Exp. when mpij < mpii -0.0171** -0.0229
(0.00654) (0.0172)
Exp. when mpij > mpii -0.00499 -0.0729***
(0.00875) (0.0261)
Exp. w when mpij < mpii -0.0161** -0.0222
(0.00635) (0.0165)
Exp. w when mpij > mpii -0.00523 -0.0700***
(0.00850) (0.0252)
ln(Tot Assets) -0.0369 -0.0426 -0.0368 -0.0427
(0.125) (0.122) (0.125) (0.122)
ROA -0.00125 -0.00554 -0.00142 -0.00499
(0.0731) (0.0735) (0.0730) (0.0733)
Income diversity -0.118*** -0.100*** -0.118*** -0.0994***
(0.0355) (0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0359)
Asset diversity 0.216 0.753* 0.215 0.741*
(0.307) (0.439) (0.308) (0.435)
Tier1/Asset -0.0102** -0.0177*** -0.0102** -0.0176***
(0.00497) (0.00628) (0.00497) (0.00627)
Deposits/Asset -0.000658*** -0.000191 -0.000654*** -0.000198
(0.000207) (0.000383) (0.000208) (0.000383)
Observations 141 141 141 141
R-squared 0.974 0.959 0.974 0.959
FE bank year bank year bank year bank year
Instr. pred. k jt pred. k jt
F-Test 1st 11.57 11.81
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.4.3 Regulation
At last we examine the impact of variations in regulation on the usual relation. We proxy
regulation with the macroprudential index (MPI) of Cerutti, Claessens and Laeven (5). For
each origin country i we partition destination countries in two groups depending on whether
their regulation is stricter than the origin country (mpij > mpii) or less strict (mpij < mpii).
As in the case of diversification, we instrument the two endogenous groups of openings with the
corresponding predicted expansions.
From the estimates reported in Table 2.13, we see that a large part of the overall negative
effect of geographic expansion on bank riskiness in the sample is (un-surprisingly) driven by
the expansion to countries with stricter regulation. If banks expand in countries with stricter
regulation the monitoring exerted by the supervisor is likely going to reduce risk.
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2.5 Conclusion
We have build an original dataset on 15 European banks classified as G-SIBs by the BIS to assess
whether expansion in foreign markets increases their riskiness, and through which channels this
eventually happens. We have distinguished a ‘between effect’ from a ‘within effect’. According to
the former effect, banks that expand abroad more have lower riskiness so that, given individual
bank riskiness, their expansion reduced the (weighted) average riskiness of the banks’ pool.
According to the latter effect, foreign expansion of any given bank makes the bank and thus the
banks’ pool less risky.
We have found that there is a strong negative correlation between riskiness and foreign
expansion. This is due to a robust ‘within effect’ as well as to less robust ‘between effect’. In
terms of the channels, we have found evidence that diversification, competition and regulation
are all important in explaining the ‘within effect’. Expansion in destination countries with more
opportunities for diversification (lower business cycle comovement) and with stricter regulation
than the origin country decreases a bank’s riskiness. As for competition, expansion has a distinct
impact on riskiness only when competition in the origin country is less intense than in the
destination countries.
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Appendix A
Countries
Origin countries of banks: France, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, Nether-
lands, Spain and Sweden.
Host countries: All potential origin countries and Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgary, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Lituania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine.
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Appendix B
Openings
Table B.1: Number of openings of foreign units by host country and year
Countries 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Albania 1 1 2
Austria 2 3 1 5 3 1 1 16
Belgium 4 4 2 2 2 1 1 16
Bulgary 3 2 1 1 1 8
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 1 3
Switzerlnad 4 3 2 2 3 2 16
Cyprus 1 1
Czech Republic 2 1 1 2 1 1 8
Germany 5 8 4 5 2 1 5 1 2 1 34
Denmark 1 2 2 4 2 2 1 1 2 17
Spain 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 14
Estonia 2 1 3
Finland 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 8
France 3 2 2 1 8
UK 5 9 4 5 2 1 3 1 30
Greece 1 3 1 1 1 7
Croatia 2 1 1 1 5
Hungary 2 2 2 1 1 1 9
Ireland 4 1 7 1 1 14
Italy 5 7 5 7 2 4 1 1 32
Lithuania 2 1 3
Luxembourg 4 7 6 1 4 3 5 1 31
Latvia 2 2
Malta 1 1
Montenegro 1 1
Netherlands 6 8 4 2 4 3 1 1 1 30
Norway 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 11
Poland 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 21
Portugal 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 13
Romania 4 2 3 1 1 11
Russia 3 4 4 2 1 1 15
Serbia 2 3 1 6
Slovakia 2 1 1 1 1 6
Slovenia 1 1
Sweden 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 13
Turkey 3 2 7 3 1 1 2 1 20
Ukraine 2 3 2 1 8
TOTAL 93 90 65 60 41 28 26 10 12 19 444
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Appendix C
Gravity Literature
The gravity framework has originally been used to describe trade flows (Tinbergen, 1962 being
the first to apply this framework) and a large literature now exist to provide strong theoretical
and empirical basis to this framework. One of the first idea for gravity is that trade flows are
decreasing with the distance, because distance raises transport costs, all other things being equal.
According to the meta analysis of Head and Mayer (2014), the distance elasticity of trade is
between 0.89 and 1.14 according to the estimation methodology. This framework has also been
applied to intangibles flows such as FDI or financial variables, showing that the geographical
distance raises other costs than transportation costs (information costs for instance). In this
case, the distance elasticity is lower, but significantly different from 0.
More specifically, a few papers are interested in the impact of geographical variables on cross-
border banking and banks international expansion. Galindo et al. (2003) show that the bank
penetration measured by the sum of assets of banks of the host country held by banks in the
source country decreases with the distance between the two countries. They measure a distance
elasticity of 0.32. Buch (2005) confirms this result using data of foreign asset holdings of banks
located in France, Germany, United Kingdom and USA. She finds an elasticity of 0.65 in 1999
that varies between 0.31 in France to 1.13 in Italy. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003) show that bank
foreign investment is also consistent with the gravity framework. According to the method used,
the find an elasticity of bank foreign investment to distance between 0.3 and 0.47 according
to their fixed effects specification. Berger et al. (2004) propose a gravity analysis on bank
expansion through M&A. They find a distance elasticity of 0.88 when they include host country
and source country fixed effects. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) study the foreign location
decisions of banks in a large number of countries in 2009. In order to have an estimation close
to the gravity theory developed in the trade literature, they include the competitor remoteness
as a regressor. This regressor is intended to absorb multilateral resistance terms (see Anderson
and Van Wincoop, 2003). They find a small distance elasticity of foreign bank ownership that
varies between 0.032 and 0.115 according to the methodology used.
The difference between our gravity model and these ones is that we explicitly take into
account multilateral resistance factors, that are theoretically needed, by adding exporter-time
and importer-time fixed effects in our first estimation. Nevertheless, we do not construct our
instrumental variable using this specification because bank time-varying fixed effects are likely
to be correlated with bank’s riskiness.
Banking litterature
Paper Year Dependant variable Estimation
strat.
Dist. coef Alternative
strat.
Alt.
coef.
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Portes and Rey, JIE 2000 Gross purchases plus sales
of portofolio equities (1989-
1996)
OLS, no FE -0.881 OLS bilateral
FE
-0.646
Aviat and Coeur-
dacier, JIE
2007 Financial claims in country j
from banks located in country
I in 2001
OLS, no FE -0.445 OLS bilateral
FE
-0.74
Coeurdacier and
Martin, JoJIE
2009 log of aggregate equity hold-
ings (1), the log of banking
claims (3) in 2001
(1) bilateral
FE
-0.42 (3) bilateral FE -0.49
Buch, JMCB 2003 Log of foreign assets 2009 OLS Coun-
try FE
-0.29
Buch, RIE 2005 Log of assets of banks (1983-
1999)
OLS Coun-
try FE
-0.65 Log of liabili-
ties, OLS, coun-
try FE
-0.72
Galindo et al., WP 2003 Sum of assets of banks of
the host country in which the
source country owns 50 per-
cent or more of their equity in
2001
OLS, bilat-
eral FE
-0.318
Focarelli and Poz-
zolo, JoBusiness
2005 Dep var = 0 if the bank has no
foreign branches/subsidiaries
in j, 1 if it has a foreign branch
and 2 if it has a foreign sub-
sidiary at the end of 1998
Multinomial
logit for
branches
-0.31 Multinomial
logit for sub-
sidiaries
-0.30
Berger et al., JIMF 2004 Number of M&A in year t in
which a country i financial in-
stitution purchased a country
j financial institution divided
by the product of the GDP of
i and j (1985-2000)
Tobit, i, j
and t FE
-0.88 Tobit, t FE -0.64
Claessens and Van
Horen, JMCB
2014 Number of banks from coun-
try i in country j in 2009
Tobit, no FE -0.115 Poisson (no FE,
set of controls +
trade)
-0.033
Vlachos, WP 2004 Portfolio holdings by country
i in country j in 2001
OLS, bilat-
eral FE
-0.29
Faruqee et al., IMF
WP
2004 Stock of country j equity held
by residents of country i at the
end of 1997
Standard
gravity vari-
ables, no
FE
-0.559
Salins and Benassy-
Quere, WP
2006 Portfolio investment stocks
from country i to country j
Tobit, no FE -0.802
FDI literature
Head and Ries, JIE 2008 FDI flows PPML -0.592
Trade literature
Head and Mayer,
Handbook of IE
2014 Trade Meta-
analysis -
All gravity
-0.89 Meta-analysis -
Structural grav-
ity
-1.14
Note: Zeros are generally treated using log(1+variable). FE stands for Fixed effects. "Bilateral FE" means
source and host country fixed effects.
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Appendix D
Comovement, Regulation and
Competition
Table D.1: Descriptive statistics on comovement, regulation and competition
Comovement Competition Regulation
Source countries Host countries Source countries Host countries Source countries Host countries
Mean 0.92 0.80 0.92 0.87 1.44 1.49
Sd 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.07 1.13 1.41
Min 0.78 0.31 0.98 0.97 0.00 0.00
Max 0.97 0.98 0.80 0.69 3.00 4.89
Note: Data is averaged over all years in the sample. Source countries are excluded
from the host countries statistics
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